Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2006 陈金明 中国对外援助的五大关系论\_基于问题意识的一种解读 - § 6 references coded [ 7.32% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 2.65% Coverage

国作为援助国与受援国之间的关系。   
应该看到, 1964年我国对外援助八项原则既有历 史的进步性, 同时也有其时代的局限性。一是尽 管中国政府强调外援不是单方面的赐予, 而是双 方的合作, 但事实上造成了某些受援国对我国外   
援长期过度的依赖。特别是由于中国对外援助 “绝不附带任何条件”, 这样往往会造成许多外援 物资、资金被挪作他用或严重浪费, 而没有发挥其 应有的成效。二是对于延长还款期限或减免债务 的问题往往存在较大的随意性, 使得许多受援国 养成一种侥幸心理, 要么拖延还贷, 要么等待减 免, 而一旦减少或停止外援, 将会严重影响甚至恶 化两国外交关系。实际上, 在经济全球化时代, 中 国作为援助国与受援国之间并非是一种简单的援 助与被援助的关系, 而是一种相互依存、共同发展 的关系。通过外援, 能帮助受援国稳定社会政局, 缓解经济困难, 开发国内资源, 扩大消费市场, 促 进经济发展;同时又有利于提升中国国际地位, 创 造安宁的国际环境, 密切中国与受援国的友好关 系, 开辟中国的资源市场和商品市场, 为实现祖国 统一赢得更多的国际支持。

Reference 2 - 0.70% Coverage

但至今没有形成规范的援助理论体系和完善的操 作规程, 尤其在对第三世界重债穷国的贷款减免 方面有很大随意性, 缺乏科学的外援理论指导。 对外援助的研究也还未引起政府管理部门以及学 界的高度重视, 因此, 系统研究中国对第三世界的 外援问题很有必要。

Reference 3 - 1.10% Coverage

就目前而言, 中国的对外援助活动越来越引   
起国内和国际社会的不理解。在传统体制下, 中 国政府的对外援助一直是一项保密性很强的政治 工作, 随着我国政治经济体制改革和对外开放的 不断深化, 对外援助工作的透明度较以前逐步加 强, 自 1993年起, 中国政府开始在国家财政支出 统计表中公布“对外援助支出”的数字。但当前外 援的整体透明度依然模糊, 这样既不利于公众监 督, 也引起公众不少误解。

Reference 4 - 1.20% Coverage

为什么会出现如此局面? 关键是我们的外 援理论还不规范、科学, 特别是不能有效地解释我 们的外援实践。马列经典作家曾说过, 理论只要 彻底, 就能说服人, 只要说服人, 就能变成改造世 界的物质力量。那么, 又如何消解国内公众和国 际社会对我国外援战略的诘问与怀疑? 这就需要 中国外援战略理论的丰富与完善, 并运用它去说 服国内公众增进对此项事业的理解与支持, 促进 国际社会“增信释疑”, 为我国外援工作创造良好 的氛围和舆论环境。

Reference 5 - 1.24% Coverage

第二, 在早期的对外援助工作中, 中国没有充   
分落实“增强受援国自力更生能力”这一原则, 对 受援国往往有求必应, 采取“大包大揽”的 “输血 式”援助方法, 造成了受援国的依赖性。当中国政 府不能满足受援国要求之时, 就招致它们的不满, 成为它们指责中国的借口或原因, 如对阿尔巴尼 亚的援助就是典型的事例。中国的对外援助长时 间内还存在“量力不足”现象, 在物资、人才和外汇 严重不足的情况下提供巨额外援, 对国内经济建 设造成了一定的负面影响

Reference 6 - 0.44% Coverage

第三, 在对外援助对象上, 往往特别强调意识   
形态的异同性, 而忽略了受援国实际困难;在援助 主体上, 往往只强调政府的作用, 而忽视了企业和 银行的广泛参与。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2007 黄海波 中国对外援助机制的现状和趋势 - § 12 references coded [ 7.04% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.50% Coverage

2003 年, 商务部条法部门会同相关司 局正式启动了 《中国对外援助条 例》的起草工作, 以加强援外工作 管理, 将对外援助纳入法制化管 理。   
但到目前为止, 我国援外尚 无统一的立法, 现有援外制度体   
系主要以部门规章为主体, 包括 一系列规范性的文件和内部规 则。

Reference 2 - 0.44% Coverage

施 《关于建立对外援助项目经济 技术咨询服务网络的内部暂行规 定》、《对外援助项目招标工作内 部管理暂行规程》等一批内部工 作规则。仅 2006 年全年制订和颁 布实行的援外管理文件就达到 38 件, 推进了援外管理的制度建 设。

Reference 3 - 0.79% Coverage

在增加援外政策透明度方   
面, 尽管目前对外援助总体信息 还未在公开出版物或官方网站上 公开, 但是已经可以在公开渠道 找到一些相关的数据和资料。 2005 年通过新闻发布会公布了 对外人道主义援助比较的详细数 据, 在商务部的年鉴上, 列有对外 援助项目的总体数额, 商务部网 站不断在发布对外援助项目的消 息; 媒体上也出现了一些援外项 目的深度报道; 中国进出口银行 也公开发布其对外信贷投资的部 分统计数据。

Reference 4 - 0.59% Coverage

我国还没有独 立的类似英国 ODI ( 海外发展研 究所) 的对发展援助问题进行专 门研究的研究力量。整个国家对 发展援助理论与政策的研究都十 分薄弱。目前, 一方面, 我国对西 方对外援助体系不甚了解, 另一 方面, 自己也还没有形成一套较 为完整, 有中国特色、适合中国国 情和经济发展水平的对外援助理 论体系。

Reference 5 - 0.68% Coverage

到目前为 止, 我国尚没有相应的对外援助 法律、法规。现有的援外制度体系 仍是由部门规章为主体, 由一系 列规范文件和部门规章构成的。 中国的对外援助总体上透明度比 较低。对于外部世界而言, 我国的 援外决策是怎样制定的, 决策主 体是谁, 决策过程是怎样的等都 笼罩着几分神秘的色彩, 决策内 容更不必要经过人大的批准, 因 此我国对外援助工作的随意性较

Reference 6 - 0.72% Coverage

相当 一部分新企业缺乏承担援外任务 的实践经验和思想准备, 对援外 工作的政治性和政策性要求缺乏 正确认识; 在主体监管方面, 适当 的激励机制、必要的约束机制和 刚性的退出机制还不健全; 在主 体选择方面, 现行援外项目招投 标制度在坚持“公平、公正”原则 的基础上还没有根本处理好 “公 平”与“合理”的关系, 特别在企业 评价以及合理反映企业既有业绩 和优势方面有待改进。

Reference 7 - 0.42% Coverage

其次, 优惠贷款管理方面,   
2004 年以来, 虽然优惠贷款发展 迅猛, 项目可行性评估工作逐步规 范, 但这一类项目还没有建立配套 的资格准入制度和竞争制度。主体 管理方面的滞后在一定程度上影 响了优惠贷款的使用效果。

Reference 8 - 0.55% Coverage

重视, 2002 年以来用于人力资源 开发培训的援外支出增长很快, 培训领域和专业范围不断扩展。 但相对于援助规模和内容的迅速 发展, 援外人力资源培训的主体 资格管理仍相对滞后。 此外, 我国援外管理工作还   
存在援外规章制度不健全, 项目 管理不规范, 援外人员队伍素质 有待提高等问题。

Reference 9 - 0.76% Coverage

也越来越大。2005 年, 中国政府 通过联合国多边救援行动向海 啸受灾国提供了 2000 万美元捐 助。从 2006 年起, 中国已经开始 从联合国粮食计划署 (WFP) 的 受援国转变为援助国。农业部的 官员表示, 中国政府重视同 WFP 的合作, 我们愿意继续加强与 WFP 之间的合作。但总的来说, 中国对多边渠道还未予以充分 的重视, 通过多边渠道的援助还 比较少, 援助的力度不够, 涉及 的范围也不广。

Reference 10 - 0.99% Coverage

在官方援助中纳入 NGO 的   
参与, 可以适当缓冲和“稀释”官 方援助的政治性, 有时更容易被 受援国国民接受。一国公民对他 国的善意表达, 有时候比为表达 政治意愿而进行发展援助的政府 有更强的感染力。近年来, 国际 NGO 在外援机制较成熟的国家 中起到了越来越大的作用。 早在上个世纪 80 年代, 我   
国政府就开始吸纳 NGO 参与对 外人道主义援助, 扩大资金来 源。2004 年印度洋海域发生海啸 之前, 中国已有民间力量参与对 外人道主义援助, 但是规模比较 小, 主要通过中国红十字会、中 华慈善总会等民间团体进行。

Reference 11 - 0.41% Coverage

中国 NGO 组织和中资企业开始参与到对 外援助中, 向当地政府提供了一 些紧急的援助。中华慈善总会和 中国红十字会成为政府指定接 收社会捐款的 NGO。之后, 中国 扶贫基金会也跻身国际人道主 义救援组织的行列。

Reference 12 - 0.20% Coverage

但是, 总 的来说, 中国对外援助中缺少民 间参与的活力, NGO 发育低下, 能力不足, 在外援机制中参与程

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2010 周弘 中国援外六十年的回顾与展望 - § 4 references coded [ 3.59% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.79% Coverage

共同发展既是受援国的需要, 也是中国自身发展的需要。历史经验证明, 中国   
不可能脱离外部世界而孤立地发展起来, 帮助其他国家发展也就是帮助自己发展。 对外援助带动了包括观念 、经验 、技术 、资金、物资等在内的多种要素的跨国流动, 这 是成功的发展不可或缺的因素, 也是中国和其他发展中国家进一步发展的必要途 径。在未来的世界上, 不仅发展中国家的发展事业需要中国的支持, 而且广大发展

Reference 2 - 0.72% Coverage

同时还应当注意到, 对外援助作为一种政府行为, 可以起到规范市场力量行为、   
弥补市场力量不足的独特作用。不少资源型非洲国家能够比较快速地发展和繁荣 起来, 有一个原因就是它们利用外来援助, 投资那些私人资本不愿意投资或者没有 能力投资的领域, 获取和掌握对于发展至关重要的自然资源。②在这方面, 中国援助 和贷款做出的贡献已经在国际上得到承认。③

Reference 3 - 1.29% Coverage

对外援助是跨部门的工作领域, 涉及多种专业知识。对外援助将 中国与发展中受援国的关系具体化为诸如项目的贷款 、体育场馆的建设、公路桥梁的架 设、医疗服务的提供、培训课程的制定等业务, 如果对于这些业务一无所知, 例如对于统 计方法缺少概念, 对于医疗卫生规律全无了解, 对于经济贸易知识一知半解, 仅凭少量 的国际关系理论话语是无法就对外援助开展深入研究并获得真知灼见的。 此外, 对外援助的提供者具有各自不同的援助动机和援助方法, 这也是研究对   
外援助的一个难点。研究者需要在聚焦于一个方面和一个角度 (外交角度, 抑或是 经济技术角度, 或者其他角度 )的同时, 了解这个角度在复杂的援助关系中的具体地 位, 避免以偏概全

Reference 4 - 0.78% Coverage

在当今世界上, 无论援助者出于怎样的动机, 都难以绕开对外援助的时代主题:   
发展中国家的发展和世界的均衡发展。发展的议题不仅包括经济贸易和技术发展, 更包括发展的所有方面, 包括市场的培育和规范、政府的职能与效率、社会结构与社 会分配 、教育进步与知识创新 、文明程度与理论研究水平等等。中国在综合发展研 究方面缺乏理论积累和基础训练的缺陷, 也暴露在对外援助的研究领域。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2010 杨鸿玺 中国对外援助\_成就\_教训和良性发展 - § 15 references coded [ 7.56% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.88% Coverage

对外援助是中国对外工作的重要组成部分，是促进中国与发展中国家友好 合作关系的重要方式和渠道。中国针对广大亚非拉地区的对外援助促进了受援 国的发展和民众生活的改善，并对一些国家反抗外来入侵起到支柱性的支撑作 用，同时也提高了中国的国际地位和影响。对外援助八项原则充分体现了中国 无私的国际主义精神，体现了中国同受援国家进行经济合作的真诚愿望。对外 援助使中国在第三世界发展中国家享有很好的声誉；中国提供的援助项目短期 内就可见明显成效，而且援助慷慨，条件优惠，受到受援国政府和人民的普遍 欢迎。

Reference 2 - 0.32% Coverage

中国政府采取的这些 政策措施，以满足广大非洲国家的关切和需要为根本宗旨，领域广，力度大， 有助于促进非洲经济社会发展，进一步夯实中非友好合作关系，在非洲国家和 国际社会引起热烈反响。

Reference 3 - 0.66% Coverage

中国援外工作受到受援国和国际社会的普遍欢迎和好评。东帝汶总统奥尔 塔高度赞赏中国企业精神和作风，号召本国人民用“中国速度”推进国家建设。 赞比亚前总统姆瓦纳瓦萨说，中国为改善赞比亚人民生活条件作出了重要贡 献。联合国秘书长潘基文表示，中国一直努力与所有非洲国家发展合作伙伴关 系，这令人鼓舞。世界银行行长佐利克表示，在推动全球发展问题上，中国是 世界银行重要的合作伙伴。

Reference 4 - 0.31% Coverage

第一，对外援助是打破少数发 达国家的垄断地位，维护世界和平，创造一个和平的经济建设国际环境的需要。 对广大发展中国家提供一些援助，对于创造有利的和平稳定的国际环境具有重 要意义

Reference 5 - 0.32% Coverage

第二，通过帮助受援国建立和发展民族经济，增进了与受援国间的友 好关系，广大发展中国家成为中国对外工作独特的政治优势和宝贵财富，对维 护和提高我国在国际事务中的影响力发挥着积极作用。

Reference 6 - 0.14% Coverage

第三，有利于我国合   
理双赢地利用境外资源，为缓解中国资源的紧缺问题提供出路。

Reference 7 - 0.87% Coverage

中国改革开放之前的对外援助有许多教训，如对外援助实际运行当中随意   
性很大，数额庞大，往往超出设计很多，在不少年份远远超出国民经济承受能 力，影响了中国自身发展和中国人民生活水平的改善，甚至因优先购粮外援而 影响了对国内灾民的救急。在执行对外援助项目过程中，许多人为祖国和受援 国献出了宝贵的生命。在大规模地援助他国时，中国却拒绝接受外国的援助， 唐山大地震时中国一味坚守自力更生，引起广泛的疑惑不解，这也是很不正常 的。③   
事实表明，过度的对外援助是不可持续的，中国对外援助改革势在必行。

Reference 8 - 0.45% Coverage

第二，提高了成套设备中智力、   
技术支援的比重，建成了一些影响较好的大型项目，增加了受援国自力更生的 能力。据统计，1981 至 1985 年，我国对外成套设备的援助从前 5 年的 58．2 ％提高到了 74．1％，1987 至 1988 年，为 70％左右。智力、技术支援的

Reference 9 - 0.37% Coverage

改革开放之前，计划经济体制下中国的对外援助体制有其优点，由于党中 央和国务院对援外工作统抓统管，中央领导人直接过问援外工作，分管部委直 接对中央负责，援外管理机构能够有效地利用行政指令的方法，实现全国一盘 棋。

Reference 10 - 0.57% Coverage

其弊端也不断暴露。单纯靠行政手段管理经援项目，财务管理实行预 决算制，一切费用实报实销，项目投资多少，建设周期长短，工程质量优劣， 同执行单位的经济利益没有关系，这不利于充分调动项目执行单位和广大援外 人员的积极性。对外援助的决策也由于缺乏可行性研究而偏向规模过大、承诺 任务超重等由意识形态因素导致的违反经济规律的现象

Reference 11 - 0.23% Coverage

第一，对外经济援助工作缺乏完 整的理论指导，中国还没有形成一套较为完整、有中国特色、适合中国国情和 经济发展水平的对外援助理论体系。

Reference 12 - 0.42% Coverage

对外援助未纳入法制化的轨道，对 外援助战略不清晰。在发达国家，无论是美国、日本还是欧洲国家，都有对外 援助法和相关法案，而我国尚没有相应的对外援助法律、法规，现有的援外制 度体系仍是由部门规章为主体，由一系列规范文件和部门规章构成的。

Reference 13 - 0.37% Coverage

非政府组织（NGO）在援助中的作用未得到有效发挥。在官方援助中纳入NGO 的参与，可以适当缓冲和“稀释”官方援助的政治性，有时更容易被受援国国 民接受。中国NGO在外援机制中参与程度很低，作用还十分有限。③

Reference 14 - 0.78% Coverage

中国对多边渠道还未予以充分的重 视，通过多边渠道的援助还比较少，援助的力度不够，涉及的范围也不广。 中国需要加强对外援助理论研究，加快对外援助立法，加强制度建设，建   
立系统成熟的援助机制，加强与多边援助组织的合作，并充分发挥NGO在对 外援助中的作用。④   
在推进援外机制建设方面，在决策、管理、执行机构之间   
应该有明确分工，借鉴国外发达国家的经验，建立协调统一的决策体制。区分 对项目和战略的评估，注重综合效果和全程评估，促进行政部门改革。

Reference 15 - 0.85% Coverage

中国对外援助仍要量力而行。对外援助关乎国家战略利益，不可不为，但   
与此同时，自己的“功课”也要做好。国际金融海啸发生以来，不时有希望中 国充当“救世主”的声音。中国领导人多次表示，中国会与各国一起共同抵御 这场危机，而把自己的事情办好，这本身就是对世界最大的贡献。这一决策无 疑是正确的。中国应以本国人民为“第一优先”，拉动内需、贫困人口脱贫、 社会群体安抚皆不可等闲视之。对一些贫穷国家进行适当援助，是一个大国对 国际事务负责任的表现，但无休止的援助绝不是一个国家应尽的义务

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2010 熊厚 中国对外多边援助的理念与实践 - § 14 references coded [ 5.89% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.33% Coverage

中国多边援外取得了显著 成就, 既促进了包括中国在内的发展中国家的共同发展, 也有力地配合了 中国多边外交的开展, 改善了中国的国际形象。当前, 中国多边援外既面 临合理满足国际社会不断增长的期望值的挑战, 也需要解决资金有效利用 的问题。

Reference 2 - 0.63% Coverage

1972年, 中国在联合国大会上指出, “中国愿意同其他发展中国家一道, 努力发展这种平等互利的新型的国际经济关 系。”③那么, 向联合国发展系统 (主要指以促进发展为目的的联合国组织和专门机 构 )提供资金支持是实现该理念的重要形式。同时, 中国提出了多边援外的指导思   
想, “尊重受援国的主权和平等地位, 不附带任何条件, 不要求任何特权;而不应该以 `援助’ 为幌子, 把受援国当成控制和掠夺的对象, 粗暴地干涉受援国内政, 甚至乘机 进行颠覆活动。

Reference 3 - 0.52% Coverage

然而, 由于意识形态的冲突和对联合国援助机构情况的不了解, 中国对加入这   
些发展机构和提供资金持谨慎态度, 有选择地参与了部分机构。中国最先选择参加 联合国发展系统, 在 1972年先后参加了联合国环境规划署 、联合国开发计划署 、世界 卫生组织、联合国教科文组织和联合国工业发展组织等机构, 在 1973年参加了联合 国粮食及农业组织。中国在参加这些机构后陆续提供了捐款

Reference 4 - 0.39% Coverage

以世界银行为例, 中国认为西方国家的市场经济和自身的计划 经济格格不入, 不认同世界银行的发展理念, 而且世界银行和联合国系统的运行方 式不同, 不是一国一票, 美国在世界银行和国际货币基金组织均占有很大的份额, 占 有主导地位, 拥有否决权, 因而中国拒绝参加, 更不会提供援助。

Reference 5 - 0.61% Coverage

中国的多边援外也体现了促进共同发展的诉求。中国加入   
上述多边发展组织的直接诱因是获取国内经济建设所需的资金和先进技术, 但中国 既是受援国又是援助国的身份定位, 决定了中国在接受多边援助的同时必须向这些 多边组织提供援助。这是 “作为发展中国家的一员, 中国愿意继续向其他发展中世 界的朋友和伙伴提供力所能及的援助”②理念的延续。中国对多边发展组织提供的 捐款日趋务实, 体现了 “力所能及”的考量, 纠正了之前负担过重的做法。

Reference 6 - 0.19% Coverage

新的务实理念被引入进来。   
中国在新的 “有取有予 ”的援外策略下向多边组织提供力所能及的援助, 但这种 “予 ” 更多地表现为被 “取”所推动。

Reference 7 - 0.85% Coverage

中国的多边援外也向地区层次发展。中国在政治和经济的双重考虑下, 于 1985   
年和 1986年相继加入非洲开发银行和亚洲开发银行。中国加入非洲开发银行, 对其 融资和捐款, 不仅着眼于在政治上产生较好影响, 也力图为中国与非洲国家开展经 济合作开辟一条新渠道。中国加入亚行集团, 加强了与本地区国家的政治经济合 作, 还取得了亚行的资金和智力资源。当然, 中国向亚行和非行的贡献也是在力所 能及的范围之内。中国向亚行和非行提供融资及捐款, 从经济方面看是将 “务实”理 念引入多边援外工作, 从政治方面看则是 70年代援外理念的延续。 1986年 “多边外 交 ”政策的提出及落实, 也进一步促进了多边援外的发展。

Reference 8 - 0.44% Coverage

中国多边援外从 “有取有予 ”逐渐转变为“多予少取”, 主要从多边发展机构获取   
技术知识和管理经验, 而不再特别注重获得发展资金。在一些多边发展组织相继取 消或者减少对中国多边援助的同时, 中国多边援外却明显增加。此外, 在尊重主权 独立的原则基础上, 中国开始传播发展经验、创造机会、改善民生、促进平衡发展。

Reference 9 - 0.30% Coverage

第三, 中国 对多边外交认识的提高, 自然而然也带动了多边援外的发展。多边援外是促进国际 经济体制和规则合理化, 实现多边外交目标的重要工具。在多种因素的综合影响 下, 我国多边援外工作开始进入一个新的发展阶段。

Reference 10 - 0.07% Coverage

:第一, 多边援外往往根据多边外交的变化而调整。

Reference 11 - 0.08% Coverage

这个特点贯穿我国多边外交和多边援外政策发展的整个过程。 5

Reference 12 - 0.49% Coverage

第二, 中国多边 援外为开展多边外交创造了良好的条件。比如, 随着中国对世界银行资金和智力贡 献的扩大, 中国在世界银行中的地位日益重要, 中国的发展经验也逐渐在世行得到 认可和推广, 增加了国际社会对中国发展的认可程度。不仅如此, 多边援外还日益 成为塑造中国负责任大国形象的重要手段。整体而言, 中国多边援外为多边外交的 开展营造了有利的环境。

Reference 13 - 0.21% Coverage

另外, 现行 的多边援助机制仍然受美国等西方发达国家主导, 中国在其中发挥的作用受到牵 制。如何使中国多边援外的效用最大化是中国面临的另一个现实挑战。

Reference 14 - 0.77% Coverage

中国的多边援外体现了中国的 国际责任, 向世界传播了中国的发展经验, 促进了世界的普遍发展和共同繁荣, 增强 了中国的国际影响力。随着中国经济力量的迅速上升, 世界各国对中国多边援外的 期望值也在上升, 要求中国作出更大贡献。中国多边援外在合理满足这种期许的同 时, 必须努力使自己提供的日渐增多的援助在当前西方国家主导的多边发展体系中 被正确使用。展望未来, 中国多边援外要发挥自有资金的杠杆效应, 不应该仅靠增 加资金突出中国对国际社会的贡献, 更要注重在发展理念和规则上影响世界, 积极 塑造一个有利于中国和发展中国家共同发展的国际环境。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2012李小瑞 中国对外人道主义援助的特点和问题 - § 6 references coded [ 2.89% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.75% Coverage

首先，制定有关对外人道主义援助的法律法规， 完善人道主义援助机制。人道主义援助是中国依据 国际人道法应承担的国际义务，国际法对国家用什 么方式在国内实施没有特定的要求，中国宪法也没 有关于国际法在中国适用的规定。从中国处理国际 法与国内法关系的实践来看，由立法机关对现有国 内法进行修订和增补，从而保证国际法在国内实施 是一种重要的方式。目前国内还没有关于对外人道 主义援助的专门立法，也没有相关法律法规对人道 主义援助作出规定

Reference 2 - 0.79% Coverage

其次，重视国际组织的作用，加强与联合国机构 和民间组织在人道主义援助领域的合作。提供对外 援助的国家主要以西方发达国家为主，中国和西方 国家在援助理念上有明显不同，中国对外援助历来 以双边援助为主，这一特点也体现在人道主义援助 上。但中国政府重视与国际组织的合作，中国参与 国际组织的程度超过了同等发展水平国家的平均参 与水平。② 国际组织是展示国家形象和实力的重要 舞台，加强与国际组织的合作有助于提升中国在国 际社会的影响力，争取在国际社会的话语权

Reference 3 - 0.22% Coverage

国政府通过加大与民间组织的合 作力度，在官方援助中吸纳民间组织参与，可以适当 缓冲和稀释政府对外援助的政治性，使之更容易被

Reference 4 - 0.42% Coverage

规范对民间援助资金的管理，按照国家的 援助政策引导资金投向。近年来，一些企业、社团法 人甚至个人都参与到对外人道主义援助的实践中， 这些民间力量向国际社会传达中国人道主义援助的 真实愿望，树立中国援外的国际新形象，成为政府援 助的有益补充。

Reference 5 - 0.19% Coverage

援助工作有较高的保密要求而公开度有限，对外援 助的成绩缺乏正面宣传，因此经常受到西方国家不 实言论的攻击。

Reference 6 - 0.52% Coverage

其实，人道主义援助有别于其他方式的 对外援助，其主要基于人道主义目的、较少带有政治 色彩的特征决定了它涉及国家核心利益和秘密非常 有限。相反，这种援助方式可作为改善多边、双边国 际关系和扩大国家影响力的绝好工具。因此，中国 政府应及时公布人道主义援助的内容和金额，并通 过新闻媒体加大宣传力度。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2013 朱丹丹 国际援助体系与中国对外援助 影响 挑战及应对 - § 3 references coded [ 2.37% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.87% Coverage

中国等新兴援助国 的发展壮大客观上削弱了发达国 家在国际援助体系中的主导地 位， 成为国际发展援助体系中具 有重要影响力的一极。 对受援国 来说， 中国作为援助国角色的出 现和发展使国际发展援助的数额 不断增加、渠道更加多样化，受援 国在援助类型和援助国方面不再 像以前一样仅限于在“标准化”的

Reference 2 - 0.74% Coverage

在法律和政治基础方面， 到目前 为止， 我国对外援助尚无统一的 立法， 现有援外制度体系主要以 部门规章为主体， 包括一系列规 范性的文件和内部规则。 在援助 一致性和组织机构设置方面，整 体来讲， 我国对外援助活动的一 致性程度较低， 组织机构设置不 合理。

Reference 3 - 0.77% Coverage

NGOs 往往规模庞大， 具有 很强的政治影响力， 在官方发展 援助中纳入 NGOs 的参与, 可以 适当缓冲和“稀释”官方发展援助 的政治性， 有时更容易被受援国 国民接受。然而，中国的对外援助 一直由政府主导， 私人部门和民 间社会团体等 NGOs 的作用尚未 得到重视。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2013 白云真 中国对外援助的战略分析 - § 3 references coded [ 1.39% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.38% Coverage

门 各利益集团和组织 研究机构及公众舆论等 各种因素 的博弈与协调 日 益成为 中 国政府面临的艰巨任务   
、 , , 。 为此 中国应该加强管理 引导和调节政府 公司 以及社会   
等援助主体的援助行为 促进传统对外援助 向现代对外援助的转变 注重社会力量在 中国对外援助中的角色 构建中国对外援助的大战略格局

Reference 2 - 0.61% Coverage

战略 集中意味着中国对外援助的战略方向与资源分配必须有适当的轻重缓急次序 否则会 导致战略分散与过度伸展 增加援助的政治成本 中 国对外援助的战略方向应该放在 亚洲 尤其是东亚 其次是南亚和中亚 而中 国对外援助 的战略资源应该集中在非洲 特别是非洲不发达国家 即使在东亚 中 国对外援助也应该集中在柬埔寨 老挝和缅 甸等国家而不是菲律宾 越南等 尽管对东南亚国家的援助可以改善受援国对中国 的 形象 对化解南海争端产生 定的影响 二 对外援助的战略决策与协调能力

Reference 3 - 0.40% Coverage

国宣布向也门提供 亿元人民币 些民众或许认为对外援助并没有考虑到 中国对外 国之交在于民相亲 人民的深厚友谊是国家关系发展   
, ” ②因此 提升公众对中国对外援助意义的理解与认识是战略动员能力 的   
重要组成部分 只有在民众的了解 理解 参与和支持下 中 国对外援助战略才能具备 坚实的民意基础和战略共识

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2013 黄梅波 中国对外援助中的经济动机和经济利益 - § 7 references coded [ 4.94% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.47% Coverage

中国援外物资一般都是国内 生产的优质产品， 这在满足受援 国生产生活需要， 促进受援国经 济发展的基础上， 还提高了中国 产品在当地市场的知名度， 成为 中国对外宣传国内产品的窗口。

Reference 2 - 0.51% Coverage

按照中国对外优惠贷款的实   
施条件， 贷款项下所需设备、材 料、 技术或服务优先从中国采购 或引进， 设备采购中来自中国的 部分原则上不低于 50%，这一做 法带动了中国的技术、 设备和原 材料的出口。

Reference 3 - 0.82% Coverage

许多发达国家在早期的对外 援助中也采用过捆绑性援助的做 法。 上世纪 90 年代之前，发达国 家援助捆绑援助的平均比例基本 都在 50%以上，90 年代之后，捆 绑援助的比例才开始逐渐下降。 随着物美价廉的中国产品逐渐被 受援国认识和接受， 其他更多种 类的中国产品也进入了国际市 场， 从而扩大了中国的对外贸易 额。

Reference 4 - 0.57% Coverage

其中最具代表性的是始于 2004 年“以基础设施换石油的方   
式” 进行合作的 “安哥拉模式”。 “安哥拉模式” 是在同一时期，相 关国家基于共同的经济和政治利 益需求， 在政府政策支持和影响 下， 以企业行为为主体的平等互

Reference 5 - 1.29% Coverage

随着中国企业实力的不断壮   
大， 中国的对外直接投资取得了 长足进展。 截至 2010 年底，中国 对外直接投资企业 16000 多家， 分布于全球 178 个国家和地区， 投资金额累计 3172.1 亿美元。近 年来， 在中国政府的大力支持 下，不少中国企业开始跨国经营 和投资，中国政府的援助政策在 帮助该类与外国企业竞争、获取 资源方面，发挥了非常重要的作 用。 例如，海信南非发展有限公 司是第一个打出自有品牌进入 南非大型连锁店，实现彩电月度 销量南非第一并被评为“最佳供 应商”的中国品牌。

Reference 6 - 0.27% Coverage

从战后发达 国家对外援助的历史来看，利用 对外援助作为促进本国对外贸 易和投资的手段具有历史阶段 性。

Reference 7 - 1.00% Coverage

是发 展中国家间的互相帮助。 中国对 外提供的一些生产型项目、基础 设施、技术合作、人员培训、专家 服务等援助项目，在促进受援国 经济发展的同时，也加强了受援 国对中国企业、产品和技术的了 解，推动了双边贸易和投资的发 展，因此，中国的对外援助工作， 对于加强与发展中国家友好关 系和经贸合作，促进中国对外关 系发展和推动在全球建立和谐 稳定的国际发展中环境发挥着 重要作用。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2014 李云龙 从无偿到互利中国对外援助的转型 - § 1 reference coded [ 1.21% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 1.21% Coverage

大发展中国家进行无私援助，同时也注重结合本国 国情，量力而为，以实现互赢互利、长期发展。这种 观念上的转变对外援工作来说具有重要的意义，它 说明: 一方面，中国作为一个负责任的大国，会继续 履行自己的责任和义务，关注发展问题，对欠发达国 家和地区进行更为有效的援助; 另一方面，中国在对 外援助时会以国家利益为基础，以有益于中国经济 长期稳定的增长和国家实力的壮大为前提。只有中 国的国力逐步增强，中国才有能力为其他国家提供 更多的援助，各受援国才会长期受益。这一观念上 的变化说明中国外援工作摆脱了旧观念的束缚，更 加注重实效。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2014 王新影 中国国际援助事务话语权现状及提升对策研究 - § 2 references coded [ 1.34% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.55% Coverage

但当前的国际援 助模式是由西方发达资本主义国家主导的，中国 在国际援助事务中的发言权明显不足，并因为自 身援助理念、范式与西方国家存在明显不同而受 到来自西方国家和媒体的批评和指责。在这样的 背景下，提升中国在国际援助事务中的话语权就 具有非常重要的现实和理论意义。

Reference 2 - 0.79% Coverage

中国   
在国际援助事务中的参与程度、贡献程度和话语 权都有所提升。但整体来看，当前中国在国际援 助事务中的话语权还很有限，尤其是由于自身援 助理念、政策与西方国家所主导的援助模式有根 本差异，尚未成为国际援助事务话语权的主导者 和倡导者，这既不利于中国对外援助事务的深入 发展，也会影响国际发展合作事业的进展，因此， 未来中国应有针对性的采取措施，提升自身在国 际援助事务中的话语权。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2015 宋微 中国对外援助意义的再思考 - § 4 references coded [ 4.37% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 1.24% Coverage

对外援助是中国企业   
“走出去”的有益途径 中国政府开展对外援助的首 要目的是满足受援国的发展需 要， 帮助受援国提高自主发展能 力。同时，通过对外援助的战略投 入， 带动中国与发展中国家的经 贸合作， 缓解自身重要能源资源 的瓶颈制约， 提升中国具有自主 知识产权产品、 技术和标准的国 际化程度，为推动中国企业“走出 去”拓展市场空间。

Reference 2 - 0.57% Coverage

对外援助带动 双边经贸合作， 会更好地促进受 援国的经济发展。 中国现代化建 设已取得巨大成就， 但也存在许 多结构性矛盾， 保持经济社会可 持续发展面临挑战。

Reference 3 - 1.21% Coverage

这种“面面俱到”实际上忽视 了对援助主题的突出， 难以针对 受援国的发展短板制定差异化的 援助政策。因此，应加大规划咨询 等软援助力度， 在受援国需求调 研上做足功课。 针对各国的具体 情况，设置短期援助规划，重点解 决某一领域的发展难题。 在明确 援助主题和方向的前提下， 再添 加相应的工程类项目、 技术合作 和相关专家派遣等。

Reference 4 - 1.35% Coverage

一些受援国由于民主 制度不完善，政府腐败现象严重。 当前中国只针对受援国现政府的 援助模式难免授人以柄。 再加上 宣传不到位， 一些民众甚至认为 中国援外工程队是来抢他们饭碗 的。有鉴于此，中国不能一再忽视 受援国民间组织的作用。 因为在 一些弱势政府的国家， 社会组织 发挥了制衡政府的“第二轨道”作 用；而在一些转型国家中，社会组 织正在积极推动“官民共治”。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2016 任晓 解析中国对外援助 一个初步的理论分析 - § 9 references coded [ 4.28% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.74% Coverage

在关系上，分析中国与援助国的关系、援外行为与国内环境以及国 际环境这三组关系。通过这一解释机制的分析可见，中国对外援助的特色与中国的三重国家身份紧密相 关，同时，援外行为中“援助”与“合作”同行，有助于改善国际经济体系，甚至可能成为中国参与全球治理 的可行路径。此外，文化传统、现代市场力量和援外体系三者共同影响着中国的对外援助行为。作为一 个崛起中的大国，国际社会期许中国承担越来越多的国际责任，在未来的对外援助中，中国应该有意识地 防止掉入通过对外援助引发大国对抗的陷阱，应当通过对外援助构建全球伙伴关系体系，突破传统的结 盟体系，进而更好地维护世界和平，促进发展。

Reference 2 - 0.29% Coverage

中国援外取得的效果是明显的: 一方 面，这是中国履行国际义务、践行国际人道主义、履行 中国作为一个负责任大国承诺的体现; 另一方面，通 过对外援助，中国在改善与他国关系、积累国际友谊 和资源、营造良好的国际环境方面都取得了成效。

Reference 3 - 0.40% Coverage

面对国内外对中国援外行为及其作用的矛盾评   
价，如何恰如其分地看待中国的对外援助? 这是一个 需要认真研究和回答的问题。事实上，将中国的对外 援助放在全球化背景下，联系到中国作为一个发展中 大国正处于崛起过程中，可以发现这种矛盾现象正是 中国崛起过程中一个自然的现象，因为一国崛起的过 程往往贯穿于各种矛盾凸显的时期。

Reference 4 - 0.22% Coverage

国内政治对国家对外援助政策和行为的影响主要表 现在两大方面: 一方面，援助国的国内政治文化、思想 和观念塑造着国家的对外援助行为，对外援助成为援 助国传播文化和价值观的重要工具

Reference 5 - 0.71% Coverage

中国从之前国际秩序的挑战者、边缘者转变成国际事 务的积极参与者，并携手其他国家共同推进国际体系 中的改革。身份的转变意味着中国开始有意识地承 担国际责任，进行人道主义对外援助正是中国承担国 际责任的体现。另一方面，中国对外援助理念的转变 之一是从国际主义转向人道主义。以往中国进行国 际主义的对外援助，主要是基于无产阶级世界革命， 主要对象又是社会主义国家和存在革命运动的国家。 人道主义援助不再以社会制度和意识形态划线，而是 表达对受灾国家的同情、关怀和帮助。作为大国责任 与义务的统一，中国的人道主义对外援助还蕴含着一 个动机，即构建良好国家形象。

Reference 6 - 0.50% Coverage

中国的对外援助也趋于法律化，法律 法规建设成果不小。如体现在对外援助资金的管理 上，已通过《对外援助合作项目基金管理办法细则》; 在援外项目管理上，则在进入 21 世纪以来通过了一 系列管理细则，包括2009 年起试运行的《对外援助成 套项目管理办法》; 在援外人员的管理上，商务部 2004 年颁布《援外青年志愿者选派和管理暂行办 法》。可以说，中国对外援助管理机构在逐步完善，管 理制度在逐步健全。

Reference 7 - 0.72% Coverage

这就是说，改革开放三十多年 来，中国逐步走向社会主义市场经济，同时经济全球 化不断拓展，中国的对外援助成为国内环境与国际环 境互动的有力纽带。从市场经济角度看，中国的对外 援助是国家行为体在经济全球化背景下进行资金再 分配的体现，缓和了全球经济中生产国际化与分配国 家化的矛盾; 同时，中国在这一波经济全球化浪潮中， 抓住了机遇，通过对外援助在国际经济秩序中拓展了 市场，在获得国际资源、中国企业走出去方面获得了 收益。而这种“援外福利”也有助于中国市场经济环 境和秩序的建立。可以说，中国稳定的对外援助和国 内市场经济的逐步建立是与经济全球化的良性互动 不可分的。

Reference 8 - 0.11% Coverage

作为发展中国家，中国在对外援助过程中 更强调与受援国地位的平等和对外援助的量力而行。

Reference 9 - 0.59% Coverage

中 国的经济总量已居世界第二，国际影响力和号召力不 断上升，但中国人均国民生产总值在全世界的排名依 旧靠后，中国仍然面临巨大的发展难题。根据这些事 实，中国仍认为自己是发展中国家。在国际对外援助 格局下，作为发展中国家一员的中国，其对外援助的 对象也是发展中国家，这首先不同于西方发达国家对 发展中国家的援助。中国的对外援助是在彼此身份 平等的基础上进行的。同时，中国对外援助的规模也 要符合中国发展中国家的身份，量力而行，不会不切 实际地超出中国的能力范围援外。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2016 丁韶彬 欧美对中国对外援助的认知及其启示 - § 7 references coded [ 3.60% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.25% Coverage

欧美国家尤其关注中国不断增加的不附加任何政治条件的援助是否会成为 受援国的替代性选择，从而削弱西方援助共同体试图以援助改善受援国人权、民主和环境问 题等方面的努力，动摇其所主导的国际援助秩序

Reference 2 - 0.36% Coverage

中国对外援助向欧盟提出了两个方面的挑战：一是中欧在援助问题上存在观念的冲突，尤其 是对于民主与经济发展的关系以及人权与国家主权的关系，都有不同的看法；二是中国对外 援助作为替代性发展援助方式的出现，可能会造成欧盟援助共识的削弱，对发展援助委员会 关于援助的共识也是一种挑战

Reference 3 - 0.19% Coverage

总之，欧盟研究者关注到了中国高调的援助行为，同时对中国对外援助给予了相对乐观、   
温和和积极的评价，并提出接触、协作、让权、效仿等积极的政策建议

Reference 4 - 0.22% Coverage

美国对中国对外援助的认知与欧盟有共同之处，但相较于欧洲研究者对中国对外援助的   
相对积极的认知和评价，来自美国国会机构、智库和大学的研究者则较为悲观、消极，充满 疑虑

Reference 5 - 1.18% Coverage

一是对中国对外援助的心态倾向的差异。欧盟本身是多边协调和合作的产物，同 时，其自身作为一个新型的多边合作体，更强调利用多边机制处理国际事务，对异质的国际行 为体抱有更多包容的心态，也乐见更为均衡的国际权力分配。因而，欧盟更多地把中国视为 国际发展合作领域的一个合作伙伴，对中国的援助模式给予了相对温和而积极的评价。而美 国作为一个相对衰落中的霸权国家，习惯于单边主义，对于中国这样的崛起中的异质权力的 任何扩大影响的行为都较为敏感。因而，对于中国在国际援助领域的积极有为，美国更多地 表现出疑虑、担忧与防范的心态。二是在评价中国对外援助时表现出立足点的差异。如前所 述，欧盟研究者普遍强调与中国等新兴援助体进行接触、协调以及进行多边合作的必要性和 可能性，并且能够开放性地接受中国在非洲等发展中世界的存在对欧盟政治经济利益的影 响。而美国研究者的立足点是自身的国家利益，更为关注中国的援助活动对美国在发展中国 家的利益和影响力有何影响和冲击，因而其对中国对外援助的规模也有远超实际的评估。

Reference 6 - 0.47% Coverage

目前的援助规模（总量及其占政府财政支出比例）与我   
国的社会经济发展水平和政策目标是相匹配的。一方面，现在我国的援助水平摆脱了先前与 经济社会发展水平不相适应的过度支出，回归到可持续的合理水平；国际环境也不需要我国 对外援助的超水平支出。另一方面，作为一个全球性影响不断扩大的大国（西方所称的“新兴 全球性行为体”），维持一定水平的对外援助支出是必要的。

Reference 7 - 0.93% Coverage

改进援外工作，增加政策透明度，加强与发达援助体的沟通、交流和合作。欧美国家对于   
中国对外援助的许多猜疑、批评和指责，实际上也包括国内的一些不同声音，都与中国对外援 助政策和数据的可获取性有关。尽管2011年和2014年两份对外援助白皮书对中国对外援助 的总体规模、构成、地区和领域分布等都做了较具体的说明，但并没有明确阐述对外援助的宗 旨和政策目标，也没有获取国别数据的渠道，这些问题不利于中国软权力的提升。因此，在援 助领域，中国应进一步阐明援外政策目标，并在这一领域进一步加强与发达援助体的合作，如 同欧盟研究者所建议的，建立一种包括传统援助体、新兴援助体和受援国在内的三边合作机 制，从而不仅有助于消减对不附加条件援助的批评，增进受援双方的相互利益，也能为传统援 助体所认同，达成多赢结果。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2016 张海冰 中国对外援助的转型和发展\_基于柬埔寨和老挝实地调研的观察与思考 - § 2 references coded [ 1.06% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.68% Coverage

中国对外援助的形象维护和建设问题是 个长期存在的问题 这不 仅涉及政府层面的信息沟通和加强透明度问题 还涉及企业和 民众之间 如何能够建立比较顺畅和常规化的沟通渠道问题 同时 中 国对外援助 形象承载在具体的援助项 目 和援助行动 中 如何总结归纳 中 国在受援 国 的援助贡献 将政府 企业和社会零散碎片化的发展贡献集合在 起 共 同构建 个多元丰富的中国援助形象是当前日 益紧迫的问题

Reference 2 - 0.38% Coverage

这些碎片化的企业援助行为从来都没有得到中 国政府和伙伴国政府 的足够重视 并加 以积极有效的宣传 反而是中 国企业的社会责任问题被 屡屡见诸报端和媒体 造成这 现象的关键在于中 国援外贡献的信息披 露机制不完善

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2017 刘晴 全球治理视角下中国对外援助的理念与策略演变 - § 2 references coded [ 1.71% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.92% Coverage

中国   
及时从“关注国家利益”转到“关注全球问题”，在全球治理 模式框架下，提供了有价值的全球公共产品，贡献了诸多有   
关全球发展的新理念、新思路和新构想。如中国推动共建 “一带一路”、设立丝路基金、倡议成立亚洲基础设施投资银 行、召集南南圆桌会议等。这些成功的案例表明，中国已经 开始在国际发展中有能力主导话语，话语影响力正在逐步 扩大。

Reference 2 - 0.80% Coverage

总体说来，中国对外援助的监管 和评估机制建设相对滞后，目前主要是以项目“总结报告” 的形式进行综合评估。为了提高对外援助项目评估的专业 化水平，中国正在加紧构建援助管理与评估体系，如湖南省 商务厅正在构建我国援外培训网络信息平台，推动援外培训 工作的综合管理与评估，建立监督和评估长效机制。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2017 朱丹丹 中国对外援助能够促进受援国的贸易发展 - § 8 references coded [ 5.45% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.45% Coverage

中国对外援助能够显著增加 受援国对中国的出口总额，但其影响存在倒“U”型“门槛效应”; 会降低受援国的出口多样化水平; 与援助相比，受援国的经济发展水平、人口、自然资源是其对外贸易发展的主要决定因素，而且人均 收入水平与出口多样化之间呈现明显的倒“U”型关系。

Reference 2 - 0.44% Coverage

目前，关于中国对外援助的研究主要侧重于分析中国对外援助的现状、管理体系等，鲜有文 献探讨中国对外援助的效果，关于中国对外援助与受援国国际贸易之间关系的研究更是屈指可 数。这主要是缘于中国对外援助数据的缺失。实际上，由于中国等新兴援助国援助数据的缺失，

Reference 3 - 0.79% Coverage

与此同时，我们可以看到，在所有影响因素中，受援国的人口对其出口总额的促进作用是最   
大的，其次为自然资源，两者每上升 1%，分别会引起受援国的出口总额增加高达 14. 77%和 2. 54%，远高于其他因素的影响效应。这在相当程度上符合当今非洲各国的发展模式和贸易模 式。对于落后的非洲地区而言，丰富的劳动力和自然资源仍然是其比较优势的重要来源，也是其 经济增长和对外贸易的核心驱动因素，这就从根本上决定了这些国家出口资源密集型和劳动密集 型初级产品的贸易模式。

Reference 4 - 1.45% Coverage

受援国的出口多样化指 24   
数越高，出口结构越集中。由于非洲地区受援国的出口结构中初级产品占比极高，使得其在国际 市场上居于非常不利的地位，而中国的对外援助进一步恶化了这种不利的局面。这意味着，虽然 中国对外援助可以增加受援国的出口总额，但却会阻碍受援国的出口多样化进程，从长期来讲， 这对受援国的贸易发展是不利的，也是中国对外援助需要认真反省的地方。实际上，在中国的对 非援助中，经济基础设施援助占比较高，经济基础设施援助会降低生产和贸易成本，从而吸引更 多企业进入市场，丰富产品结构。不过，大部分非洲国家的企业生产和出口的均是同质化非常严 重的初级产品或劳动密集型产品，引致其出口有数量无结构，出口结构更加单一，最终导致中国 经济基础设施援助的增加反而恶化了其贸易多样化程度。有学者证实，生产部门援助可能能够提 高受援国的出口多样化水平，这暗示我们，中国对非援助应该调整援助的部门结构，适当减少经 济基础设施援助，增加生产部门援助。

Reference 5 - 0.41% Coverage

受援国的人均收入水平及其平方项的估计系数出现了先正后负的变化，且均通过了 5%的显   
著性检验，表明经济增长对出口多样化的作用呈现先降后升的 “U”型趋势，即当受援国的人均 收入水平低于某一临界值时，经济增长反而会阻碍其出口多样化水平的提高。

Reference 6 - 0.65% Coverage

我们不禁猜测，一国的经济增长与出口多样化的关系可能会 经历三个阶段，即反向、正向、反向，中间会出现两个拐点，低收入水平的发展中国家处于第一 个拐点左右的第一和第二阶段，中高和高收入水平的国家处于第二个拐点左右第二和第三阶段。 正因为本文所采用的是非洲地区较为落后的发展中国家样本，因而得出的是 “U”型关系，而其 他学者选用的多是中高收入国家样本，所以得出的结论与本文相反。

Reference 7 - 0.57% Coverage

人口系数的绝对值相对大于其他变 量，这说明受援国的劳动力资源不仅是决定其出口总额增长的主要因素，也是决定其出口多样化 程度的主要因素。腐败指数和基础设施的系数都是反向的，但都没有通过 10%显著性水平的检 验，说明受援国制度效率提高、基础设施改善虽然能够提高其出口多样化水平，但这种促进作用 并不明显，与出口总额的回归结果类似。

Reference 8 - 0.69% Coverage

显示，无论是对出口总额还是出口多样化进行回归，援助均无 法在10%的显著性水平下拒绝“所有解释变量均为外生”的原假设，表明中国对外援助并不存 在内生性问题。这充分说明，中国政府并不以受援国的政治制度为条件决定对外援助的分配，更 不会将对外援助与本国的政治或战略利益相挂钩; 换言之，中国的对外援助是完全无附加条件 的，是具有平等的“南南合作”性质的，这是中国对外援助与西方发达国家援助最根本的区别

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2017 朱丹丹 中国的民生援助经验评价和改进建议 - § 8 references coded [ 4.10% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.74% Coverage

某种程度上 来讲，民生援助要具有可持续性， 技术和人才是最重要的影响因 素，因此尤其在援助中后期，“软” 援助的比重应适当增加。然而，对 于极端贫困的受援国来说， 它们 缺乏最基本的硬件配套设施，很 难支撑相关的技术传播和人员培 训项目，完善教育、医疗等基础设 施才是最急需的。因此，中国的民 生援助应进一步优化国别和部门 结构，改变“一刀切”的情况。

Reference 2 - 0.44% Coverage

国的民生援助多是根据 受援国的要求提供的， 对项目本 身缺乏规范的遴选准则， 也不会 考虑将受援国的需求与中国整体 的发展规划和援助安排相结合， 这就使得项目的可行性及其本身 能否真正达到服务于民生的目的 不确定

Reference 3 - 0.22% Coverage

其二，项目监督和评估。 中国对外援助一直缺乏系统的监 督和评估体系， 加之民生援助具 有较强的社会性， 不像

Reference 4 - 0.49% Coverage

并不 意味着援助结束， 很多项目需要 也有必要进行长期持续的运作。 中国的民生援助不太重视后期运 作， 导致一些项目建成后却由于 资金、技术或其他原因而荒废，不 但当地居民没有得到好处， 中国 的对外援助效果和影响大打折 扣，甚至备受批评。

Reference 5 - 0.54% Coverage

国对外援助的透明度一直 很低， 无论在国内外都不注重援 助实践及其效果的宣传， 这与发 达国家的做法是截然不同的。 发 达国家往往会通过公民社会甚至 教会直接在受援国帮助最需要的 民众，并连同媒体进行大肆宣传， 而且他们的援助项目到处都会注 明援助国的各种标志，

Reference 6 - 0.94% Coverage

国的民生援助较少有非政府组 织参与。究其原因，民生援助大多 是一些公益性项目， 对于追求经 济利益的私人企业缺少吸引力， 而非政府组织又缺乏参与渠道。 在中国， 非政府组织既得不到政 府部门的资金支持， 其地位和作 用也得不到政府部门的认可。 然 而， 非政府组织在民生援助中能 够发挥不可替代的积极作用。 其 一， 非政府组织多是非营利性的 机构， 所从事的都是社会公益活 动，如环境保护、社会救济、教育、 妇女儿童权益保护等， 这些大部 分都与民生援助密切相关

Reference 7 - 0.31% Coverage

首先， 必须制定完善的项目   
遴选准则。从宏观方面来讲，中国 民生援助必须抛弃以前那种只考 虑受援国要求的援助方式， 而必 须将受援国的发展需求与中国的

Reference 8 - 0.43% Coverage

追求利益是企业参与市场活   
动的动力， 中国企业支持对外援 助活动的积极性不高， 重要的原 因之一就是国家缺乏商业上的激 励，企业无法获取相应的利益。例 如， 企业参与政府外援采购很多 是强制性的，且采购价格过低

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2017 郑宇 援助有效性与新型发展合作模式构想 - § 1 reference coded [ 0.37% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.37% Coverage

由发达国家建立并主导的国际援助体制曾经为许多发展中国家提供了重要资金   
来源，其援助效果也一直颇具争议。尽管发达国家进行了一系列援助改革并取得了一 些进展，但困扰援助有效性的主要缺陷仍然存在。第一，援助资源严重不足，在全球资 本构成中的份额越来越小，难以带动经济发展。第二，援助形式不合理扭曲了正常的 激励机制，导致发达国家援助意愿低迷，受援国缺乏有效管理援助的动力。第三，援助 过于碎片化导致目标分散，造成宏观和微观效果割裂。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2017刘倩倩 亚洲与非洲官员对中国国家形象的认知 - § 6 references coded [ 3.91% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.59% Coverage

对亚洲和非洲在华研修官员的问卷调查发现   
( 表 1) ，69．95%的官员关注中国的经济实力，仅 有 1．48%的官员关注中国的军事实力，对经济和 军事实力都关注的占 25．12%。这说明，在硬实力 方面，亚洲和非洲官员更加关注中国的经济实力 对世界的影响。

Reference 2 - 0.53% Coverage

亚洲和非洲官员认为中 国发展和减贫模式对他们国家非常有用的比例都 很高。亚洲和非洲都认同中国经济发展模式的软 实力，由于地缘政治，以及中国对亚洲和非洲具有 差别的外交战略，两个地区对中国经济发展模式 的软实力认知具有差异。

Reference 3 - 0.50% Coverage

，回答显示， 64．90%的官员认为政府和当地人民都受益于中 国援助。但认为政府受益的比例高于认为人民受 益的比例 12．5 个百分点，特别是非洲官员认为政 府受益的比例高于认为人民受益的比例 13．19 个 百分点。

Reference 4 - 1.07% Coverage

近年来，无论是国内还是国外，对中国援助的   
质疑声不断。老百姓通常会质疑中国仍有 1 亿多 贫困人口，为什么要如此大规模地提供对外援助? 知识精英比较普遍地认为以大工程、大项目、成套 设备为主的对外援助不接地气，需要优化援助结 构，减少“形象工程”，增加“民生工程”。来自经 合组织援助国的评价更是复杂多样，有的认为中 国的“交钥匙”方式防止了援助资金的流失，也有 的认为中国的援助不透明、不附加政治条件，助长 了受援国的腐败，还有的认为中国援助更多的是

Reference 5 - 0.64% Coverage

8 反映的结果来看，仍存在改进的空间，63．11%的 官员认为受益很多，但仍有 35．92%的官员认为受 益一点点。在对部分官员的访谈中也发现，大家   
表 7   
希望中国的贸易和投资更具包容性和利贫性，也 就是说让当地的公司、企业有更加公平的机会，让 当地的老百姓有更多的就业机会

Reference 6 - 0.57% Coverage

就中国海外企业的整体形象而言，认为好和   
非常好的比例为 67．96%。但是，非洲官员认为中 国企业的行为表现一般的占 28．18%，差和很差占 5．52%。这说明，中国企业走出去，特别是在非洲 的企业，需要在与当地政府、企业、社会组织、社区

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2018 哈巍 中国对非洲国家的教育援助是否具有能源导向 - § 6 references coded [ 2.63% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.50% Coverage

以非洲各国石油和天然气产量为自变量，我们可   
图 4 给予加蓬政府奖学金数量 及该国石油产量变化图   
以看到石油产量的系数并不显著，但天然气产量的增 加反而对于中国给予政府奖学金资助的总数量呈现 显著的负向影响，对于学历教育奖学金的影响为负且 接近于显著（见表 3）。这说明在很大程度上，中国的政 府奖学金发放并不是能源导向的。

Reference 2 - 0.42% Coverage

合这两个数据的 具体单位可知，人口每增加一百万人，政府奖学金的 资助将会增加 4～5 个名额，而建交时间每多一年，政 府奖学金资助名额会增加 7～8 个。在建交时间上的显 著正向影响与德雷赫和福克斯的研究中所发现的结 果一致，即两国的双边关系会影响到中国的援助分配 情况[8]

Reference 3 - 0.28% Coverage

国赴境外留学人数（除赴华外）的参数均并不显 著，同时符号为负，说明欧美国家与中国在优秀留学 生的招收上存在竞争关系，一些优秀的学生倾向于前 往欧美留学，但是这种数量关系还很微弱

Reference 4 - 0.68% Coverage

能源大 发现这一外生冲击导致了每年增加了奖学金名额 2 个左右，但是统计上并不显著，说明突然增加的能源 储量并没有显著地影响到中国对非洲的援助力度。 所以，可以从上述结果得到更为确定的结论，即 石油和天然气的产量以及能源的大发现都不会对奖 学金的发放产生任何影响，甚至天然气产量的增加对 于政府奖学金的发放的总体数量还会起到负向影响。 至于这一负向影响为何产生，还需要进一步考察天然 气产量对未获得奖学金资助的数量是何种影响才能 够确定

Reference 5 - 0.38% Coverage

第一，双 边贸易额对于来华自费留学的非洲学生的总量和学 历教育有显著的正向影响，说明了双边贸易往来的频 繁拉动了来华留学的未来收益，因此即便自费来华对 于许多学生来说也是有足够吸引力的；但是双边贸易 额正如前文所示，并没有影响到教育援助的分配。

Reference 6 - 0.38% Coverage

所以，从来华留学生的奖学金数据来看，中国现   
阶段并未利用其援助政策拉拢非洲国家，使之成为自 己的原料产地和经济附庸。所以这种对于我国对外援 助的指责其本质就是渲染“中国威胁论”，在中国“走 出去”战略还立足未稳的时候，为中国增加新的困难。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2019 熊治 一带一路倡议下中国对外援助有效性的研究 - § 8 references coded [ 4.19% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.95% Coverage

援助与援助的平   
方项都很显著，并且援助的系数为正，援助平方项的系数 为负。这说明中国援助对“一带一路”发展中国家的经 济增长的影响存在“门槛效应”，具有先升后降的“倒 U 型”趋势，即中国对外援助在刚开始会显著促进其经济增 长，但是会发生边际收益递减现象。当中国对外援助达 到一个临界值时，此时援助的促进作用最大，这主要是因 为“一带一路”发展中国家国内资金短缺，基础设施严重 不足，经济环境弱，而中国对外援助刚开始能够通过补充 这些国家的资金，提高基础设施水平，提高资本的边际回 报率来改善其国内消费、政府支出、投资、健康和教育等 进而促进其经济发展。

Reference 2 - 0.57% Coverage

一带一路”发展中   
) 进行 ) ，腐败指数的最低值为 0，最高   
国家上一年的经济发展状况也会显著促进其的经济增 长，且 GDP 滞后一期的系数明显大于援助的系数，这说 明经济增长主要依赖于这些国家本国自身经济发展状 况。因此中国对外援助应该致力于改善“一带一路”发 展中国家自身的经济发展环境，才能使其经济持续增长， 避免其经济发展过于依赖援助

Reference 3 - 0.69% Coverage

均 GDP 将增加24. 11% ; 基础设施水平每提高 1%，人均 GDP 将增加 20. 87%，远远高于援助对这些国家经济增 长的影响。这主要是因为这些国家大部分技术水平低 下，以第一和第二产业为主，主要生产劳动密集型产品， 劳动力需求高，因此劳动力增加能显著促进其经济增长。 同时因为这些国家的基础设施严重不足，所以基础设施 水平的提高能够明显改善其经济和社会环境以提高资本 的边际产出率，从而促进经济增长

Reference 4 - 0.55% Coverage

，与劳动力占比不同，   
资本形成总额占比反而会阻碍“一带一路”发展中国家 的经济增长。因为这些国家主要生产劳动力密集型产 品，资本需求相对较小，当资本投入越多时，资本过剩越 严重，此时资本和劳动力投入的比例越不协调，反而阻碍 经济增长。除此之外，腐败程度显著为负，说明腐败会显 著地阻碍“一带一路”发展中国家的经济增长

Reference 5 - 0.23% Coverage

根据回归结果可知，援助对中等收入 国家经济增长的影响显著为正，但是援助对这些国家经 济增长的正面作用难以抵消这些国家潜在的负面因素。

Reference 6 - 0.62% Coverage

因此中国在针对“一带一路”发展中国家 进行援助时，要注意控制援助金额，当援助金额达到临界 值时，应该减少对这些国家的援助，努力找寻其他方法代 替援助帮助其实现经济增长。研究结果也发现受援国的 地理位置对中国对外援助有效性的影响不大，但是受援 国的收入水平会影响中国对外援助的有效性，中国对外 援助对中等收入国家的经济增长影响显著，但对低收入 国家的影响则不显著。

Reference 7 - 0.31% Coverage

一带一路”发展中国家本身的 经济发展水平和基础设施水平也会显著促进国家的经济 增长，并且其促进作用明显大于中国援助对其经济增长的 影响。因此中国在对这些国家进行援助的时候，应该制定

Reference 8 - 0.27% Coverage

此外，受 援国的劳动力占比也会对其经济增长产生显著促进作用， 因此中国援助可以通过援助提高这些国家的健康和教育 水平以提高其劳动参与率，从而促进经济增长。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2019 王孝松 制度质量\_对外援助和受援国经济增长 - § 10 references coded [ 3.51% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.09% Coverage

实证研究结果表明: 中国对外援助尤其是基 础设施援助能够有效促进受援国的经济增长; 良好的制度建设是受援国经济增长的重要保障; 分

Reference 2 - 0.17% Coverage

高制 度质量组对外援助的系数大于低制度质量组，且前者在1%显著水平上保持显著，初步支持了受援国制 度质量会影响对外援助效果的结论。当受援国制度质量比较恶劣时，别国援助不能成为一种有效的要 素投入来弥补受援国已有的物质资本和人力资本不足。

Reference 3 - 0.52% Coverage

从回归结果来看，对外援助和制度质量的回归系数依然显著为正，交互项的系数虽为 正，但不显著，这表明制度质量和援助项目总数之间的交互作用不明显，即完善的制度建设不是总能放 大别国援助的经济效应。因援助项目包括不同的类型，受援国也分布在世界上地理区位差异较大的地 区，因此在总体层面上考察制度质量的影响并不合理。所以下文将区分援助的种类、受援国的地理区 位，分别考察援助的直接效应及交互作用。 控制变量中，外商直接投资( fdi) 的系数基本在5%的水平上显著为正，这表明在本国资本不足的情 况下外国投资是发展中国家经济增长的关键要素。劳动投入( labor) 大部分不显著，这表明劳动力投入 数量的增加并非促进经济增长的主要原因，甚至可能存在一定的负向作用。与劳动力数量相比，提升劳 动者的知识积累水平比提高劳动力质量更加重要。贸

Reference 4 - 0.28% Coverage

仅从亚欧组和非洲组的回归结果来看，亚洲组援助和制度质量的系数均小于非洲组。具体来看，中   
国每增加一个援助项目，分别能够带来0． 00824 单位非洲国家的经济增长和 0． 004 单位亚洲国家的经 济增长。非洲作为世界上最贫困的地区，整体发展水平比较落后，为了实现经济的稳定增长，摆脱贫困 处境，需要长期稳定的资本流入。根据边际报酬递减定律，中国对非洲国家的援助能够产生更大的经济 效应。

Reference 5 - 0.40% Coverage

回归结果显示，二者的交互项 在亚欧组通过了10%的显著性水平检验，这说明亚洲国家的制度质量显著影响中国对外援助的经济效 应，健全的制度建设对援助的经济效应存在放大作用。非洲地区整体政治制度风险较高 ，政治制度突 变、政府倒台、政策不连续等情况时有发生，这些政治风险不仅是中国企业对非直接投资的重要风险，也 是影响对非援助效果的隐患。分组回归中值得关注的是，OECD 国家对非洲国家及拉美组国家的经济 增长存在显著正向作用。OECD 国家中的欧盟国家是非洲的前宗主国，援助是其保持在非洲影响力的 重要手段之一; 受地理区位的影响，美国对拉美国家的影响不容忽视。

Reference 6 - 0.82% Coverage

，援助的系数正向显著，并且平均每增加 1 单位的经济基础设施援   
助会带来0． 0092 单位人均 GDP 的增加。相较于表 3 的总援助回归结果，经济类基础设施对人均 GDP 的促进效应大约是总援助的。倍，这一方面说明在援助对经济增长的促进效应中，来自中国对受援国的 经济基础设施类援助发挥了主要作用，另一方面说明其他类型援助更加侧重脱贫、改善民生、提高教育 等方面，短期的经济增长效应并不十分显著。从中国对外援助的特征来看，经济基础设施一直是中国对 外援助的重点领域，虽然经济类基础设施援助项目数量占比没有明显提高，但一直稳定在 30%以上，援 助金额占比大部分稳定在60%以上且呈不断增加趋势。因此经济基础设施援助对受援国经济增长具 有明显的促进效应。   
从不同类型援助和制度质量的交互效应来看，经济基础设施援助、受援国制度质量以及二者的交互   
项均通过了10%显著性水平的检验，这说明经济基础设施援助和东道国制度质量之间对经济增长存在 显著交互效应，完善的制度体系能够更好地发挥基础设施援助对经济增长的促进作用。对于主要由政 府承接和管理、市场资源配置作用较小的大型基础设施建设项目来说，政府及官员在其修建及运营过程 中发挥的作用要大于一般投资项目，良好的制度体系能够保障项目实施的效果，显著提高劳动力和资本 要素生产率，对经济增长做出巨大贡献。

Reference 7 - 0.31% Coverage

基础设施援助尤其是经济基础设施援助不仅对受援国经济增长存在 显著的促进作用，而且其经济效应受到制度质量的显著影响。援助和制度质量的交互作用在整体制度 落后的非洲地区表现不显著，亚欧地区则表现出明显的交互效应。制度作为一种非经济因素，在发展中 国家的经济增长中发挥着至关重要的作用，良好的制度设计和制度执行能够降低交易费用，提高行政效 率，减少企业不正当的寻租行为，遏制腐败对资源配置的干扰作用，从而有效促进中国对外援助的经济 效应

Reference 8 - 0.17% Coverage

助和政府清廉程度对经济增长的正向 促进作用依然存在。与主要回归结果一致，分组回归中亚欧组和经济基础设施援助回归中交互项符号 为正且显著，政府廉洁程度对实现对外援助的经济增长作用存在正效应，这种效应主要体现在经济基础 设施援助中。

Reference 9 - 0.33% Coverage

在以援助项目数量衡量中国对外援助的回归中，全样本回归结果显示中国对外援 助能够更好地发挥 OECD 国家对外援助的经济增长效应，不存在中国援助“干扰”或“挤出”西方国家援 助的现象，拉美组回归结果同样支持这一结论。中国援建的道路、通信等配套基础设施是发挥其他援助 经济效应的物质基础之一，两种援助相互补充、相互配合，有助于实现联合国发展目标、减少贫困和实现 经济增长。在以援助金额衡量中国对外援助的回归中，因数据缺失严重、样本数量较少，没有出现显著

Reference 10 - 0.41% Coverage

本文发现制度质量的提高能够促进经济增 长，即落后的制度建设是发展中国家经济增长的阻力之一; 中国对外援助能够促进受援国的经济增长， 基础设施援助尤其是经济基础设施援助对经济增长的促进作用明显; 完善的制度体系还可以使中国对 外援助发挥更大的经济效应，这些结论在替换变量和使用2SLS 方法的回归中依然稳健。通过区分不同 区位受援国和不同类型援助，本文发现制度质量与援助的这一交互效应在亚欧受援国和经济基础设施 援助中尤其显著。拓展分析中，本文以实证研究说明中国对外援助与西方国家对外援助之间并未存在 抑制效应，中国对外援助没有阻碍 OECD 国家援助的经济效应的实现。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2019 董桂才 医疗援助对中国双边贸易的影响研究 基于门槛效应的实证检验 - § 7 references coded [ 4.10% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.32% Coverage

结果显示中国对外医疗援助存在显著的门槛效应: 当中国对受援国医疗援助 处于较低水平时，医疗援助对双边贸易的促进作用不显著; 只有对外医疗援助越过一定的门槛之后，才会引起 贸易的化学反应。

Reference 2 - 0.39% Coverage

周宝 根认为西方国家之所以对外援助投入不菲但效果欠佳，其原 因除了在于西方对外援助往往附加各种政治条件，更重要的 在于未能实现援助、投资和贸易的有机结合。因此中国应该 吸取西方国家对外援助的教训，实现援助、贸易和投资的协 同推进

Reference 3 - 0.71% Coverage

二是研究的数据问题，众所周知，中国对外援助 数据和资料收集非常困难，因此熊青龙和黄梅波(2014)在 实证分析中不得不“将我国总对外援助数据直接视为对亚 非拉的援助支出”，而且只有时间序列数据而没有国别数据， 这样就导致了该文尽管收集了 1994 － 2011 年的时间序列数 据，但实际上只有18 个样本观测点，数据缺乏可能是导致该 文结论的重要原因，因此他们自己也认为“进一步的实证研 究还有待更多资料和数据的挖掘”

Reference 4 - 0.22% Coverage

中国援外医疗   
队为促进受援国卫生事业的发展，提高人力资本和经济社会 发展水平，做出了巨大贡献，这种贡献也包括对双边贸易的 促进作用

Reference 5 - 0.95% Coverage

再次，中国援外医疗队精湛的医疗技术和敬业精神，树 立了中国专业技术人员和“中国制造”的品牌形象。援外医 疗队不仅治愈了大量传染病、常见病和多发病，还成功开展 了心脏手术、肿瘤摘除、断肢再植等高难度手术，挽救了许多 生命垂危的病人。他们不仅利用现代医疗技术，还将针灸推 拿等中国传统医药技术以及中西医结合的诊疗办法诊治了 不少疑难重症。迄今已有1000 余名援外医疗队员获得受援 国颁发的总统勋章等各种荣誉。当受援国民众看到中国医 疗队的精湛医疗技术和医疗点的先进管理水平，就会对中国 人以及“中国制造”产生信任，进而有利于中国产品在受援 国市场的销售。

Reference 6 - 1.21% Coverage

直接影响机制包括对外医疗援助设施、设 备、医疗器械和药品的贸易。间接影响机制包括医疗援助会 提高受援国人力资本水平和经济增长，改善双边政治关系以 及树立援助国形象，进而带动双边贸易发展。两种影响机制 相比较，间接影响的效果要大于直接影响的效果，但间接影 响往往要持续一定的时间、达到一定的密度、越过一定的门 槛之后，才会出现从量变到质变的转变，进而引起贸易的化 学反应。为此，在实证分析中，以中国与受援国双边贸易额 为被解释变量，以中国对受援国“医疗援助累计派出人次”作 为核心解释变量，运用门槛模型进行分析，结果显示中国对 外医疗援助存在显著的门槛效应:当中国对受援国医疗援助 处于较低水平时，医疗援助对双边贸易的促进作用不显著; 只有当医疗援助越过门槛值之后，才会对双边贸易具有显著 的促进作用。

Reference 7 - 0.28% Coverage

从促进双边贸易的角度来看，在现阶段我国对外援助资源有 限的情况下，更应该集中资源对少数国家进行持续援助，以 期获得贸易的早期收获;然后，随着我国经济的发展，再逐步

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2019顾振华 中国对非援助能否减少非洲对华贸易\_省略\_3个非洲国家数据的理论与实证研究 - § 4 references coded [ 0.94% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.16% Coverage

中国对非援助总额的增加会显著削减非洲各国对华的贸易限制指数，当援助总额增加 1%时，受援 非洲国家的贸易限制指数会下降 0． 30 ～ 0． 43 不等，这主要是由于持续的援助加深了双方的信任和了 解，非洲各国愿意向中国进一步开放;

Reference 2 - 0.29% Coverage

相比工业部门，中国对非洲各国农业部门的援助具有更强的 减少贸易限制的作用，在农业部门多投入1%的援助会比在工业部门的1%援助带来0． 4 左右的额外降 低，这意味着针对不同部门应该制定不同的援助方案，以期获得较高的援助效果。这些结论从减少贸易 限制的角度补充了学术界已有的从削减贸易成本角度出发的“促贸援助”研究 ( Cali 和 Te Velde，2011; 黄梅波和朱丹丹，2014; 朱丹丹和黄梅波，2017)

Reference 3 - 0.23% Coverage

不过随着 2012 年 AidData 数据库的发布，相关的实证研究逐渐增多。除去基础设施 ( 朱玮玮等，2018) 以及机构质量 ( 杨亚平和 李琳琳，2018) 外，有关援助产生影响的实证研究大多聚焦于两类贸易活动，即对外直接投资 ( FDI) 和 进出口贸易。这与“促贸”援助的理论观点是一致的，即援助有助于受援国提升参与贸易的能力。

Reference 4 - 0.27% Coverage

最后，适当公开援助数据，加大援助效应研究，用事实反驳所谓“新殖民主义”的宣传。一直以来， 外界对于中国对非援助的目的存在争议，少数国家将中非间的正常经贸往来刻画成掠夺资源的“新殖民 主义”。利用详实的数据和科学的研究结论作为证据，是消除这种错误认识的有力武器。因此，在条件 允许的范围内，中国政府应该进一步公开对非援助的详实数据，为打破对中国援非的错误认识提供数据 基础。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2020 于浩淼 双轨制-中国农业多边对外援助治理结构探索 - § 3 references coded [ 2.23% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 1.36% Coverage

国政府先后于 2008 年、 2014 年共向 FAO捐赠 8 000 万美元设立信托基金，这既是借助国际组织平 台支持开展南南合作，也是将知识、经验、政策、技术和专业资源等发展解 决方案在发展中国家之间相互分享和交流的一种合作方式，其作用是提高受 援国的农业生产力和粮食安全水平。截至 2019 年 10 月，中国已向非洲、亚 洲、南太平洋、加勒比海 30 多个国家和地区派出了近 1 100 名农业专家技 术员，占 FAO 南南合作项目派出总人数的 60%，约 100 万发展中国家的人 口在小型农业政策法规、水产养殖、杂交水稻、农村能源、热带作物、加工 储存、市场信息和农业文化遗产等领域受益，被誉为联合国系统南南合作的 典范之一。 这种项目操作模式不同于传统的中国对外双边援助，即以项目为主导的 也不同于西方国家开展的南北援助，即体现西方发 而是以中国政府向 FAO 捐款设立信托基金，   
基础设施“硬援助”，① 展援助话语及科层制特点；②   
选派中国农业专家赴受援国开展技术援助为主要方式推进。通过这种方式， 使中国在基金的使用方向等方面具有平等协商的主动权，反映了中国开展对 外援助的主动性与发展经验，兼具南南合作与南北合作的双重特点。

Reference 2 - 0.37% Coverage

南南合作项目具有纵横多元主体的特点（见图 1），纵向上包括中央政府、 主管部委、政府执行机构、地方政府、地方政府执行机构、援外专家，横向 上包括中国政府执行机构、受援国农业部门、国际组织、农民组织、科研机 构、私营部门、援外专家等主体，纵横交错、相互依赖，形成网络结构。

Reference 3 - 0.50% Coverage

在全球治理体系中，中国作为后来者在国际组织中的作用 还有待提升，参与全球粮食治理的内在动力尚有待提高，在通过国际组织平 台开展对外援助中尚缺乏总体战略框架的引领，在国际规则制定等方面也缺 乏一定的主导权，对国际组织的捐资及提高使用效果总体上还缺乏经验，一 定程度上导致参与有关政策、协定、规则、标准等制定的步伐滞后，难以掌 握战略制高点，也很难从技术上保障自身权益。

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 Yanzhong Domestic Politics and China’s Health Aid to Africa - § 16 references coded [ 4.44% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.11% Coverage

Unfortunately,   
a lack of transparency contributes to the dearth of research on the relationship between China’s domestic politics and its foreign aid proces

Reference 2 - 0.20% Coverage

In late April 2011, China released its first report on its foreign aid to other developing countries. While the report helps us gain a better understanding of the country’s foreign aid policies and programmes, it provides only scant information on how China’s foreign aid policy is made

Reference 3 - 0.71% Coverage

The shifting foreign aid objectives and growing emphasis on economic benefits   
may have negative impacts on the quality and effectiveness of China’s health aid projects. In 2010, patients and health-care workers of Luanda’s general hospital in Angola—built by China Overseas Engineering Group Company (COVEC) four years earlier with US$8 million—were forced to evacuate after the discovery of deep cracks in the walls of the hospital wards.73   
The market-oriented economic reforms, which   
transformed Chinese hospitals into profit-making machines, have also dampened the incentives of sending CMTs to Africa.74   
Faced with growing opportunity cost,   
experienced health workers, especially senior physicians, were reluctant to join the CMTs, and hospitals had few incentives to send them abroad. Stagnating government funding for medical teams and sustained demands from recipient countries posed additional challenges for CMTs. As of June 2012, there were about 42 CMTs posted to 41 African countri

Reference 4 - 0.17% Coverage

Unlike the United States and many other DAC members, China does not have foreign aid laws; its foreign aid policies are based on ad hoc central ministerial documents and regulations, which are not subject to approval by the legislative branch.

Reference 5 - 0.14% Coverage

When comparing aid-related decision-making in China with that of other DAC   
member states, it is worth noting that the concepts of strategic country planning or results management remain alien to China.

Reference 6 - 0.28% Coverage

s Carol Lancaster observed, due   
to the fragmented system and capacity gap in programming, implementation and evaluation, “[n]ot only does the Chinese government lack a focal point to draw on ideas on aid and development to inform their own policies but Western aid donors and foreign think tanks have no single, well informed interlocutor in Beijing to talk to at this point about these issues”.8

Reference 7 - 0.37% Coverage

The lack of a specialised and authoritative agency to coordinate China’s foreign   
aid causes problems in rendering medical assistance to Africa. As MOFCOM is not the only source of Chinese aid, it is difficult to fully gauge the extent and nature of China’s health aid to Africa.94   
Due to the lack of coordination between MOH   
(in charge of the dispatch of CMTs) and MOFCOM (responsible for constructing hospitals and related facilities), hospitals have sometimes been built without quality medical personnel or management staff.9

Reference 8 - 0.35% Coverage

As economic efficiency considerations lessened the political In August 2001, Belgian police arrested   
importance of CMTs, the decentralisation of CMT management also negatively affected the quality and discipline of CMTs.97   
15 Chinese medical staff (sent by Zhejiang province) on their way home from Mali at the Brussels International Airport on suspicions of smuggling ivory and ivory products. They were quickly released, but the international image of Chinese medical teams was tarnishe

Reference 9 - 0.48% Coverage

Authoritarian states are secretive by nature, but in China, this is compounded by the traditional Chinese philosophy that values secrecy as a critical component to state survival.99   
Added to this thick residue   
of traditional authoritarianism is the dominance of a Leninist party that believes in the need to concentrate secrets in the hands of as few people as possible. Not surprisingly, Chinese government officials tend to adopt a very loose definition of   
“secrets”, while casting a suspicious eye on anyone who is not within the system. This in part explains why China prefers bilateral aid instead of collaborating with other countries or international organisations in Africa

Reference 10 - 0.26% Coverage

The 2011 White Paper—the first official report on China’s foreign aid policy—unveils very useful information on how China’s assistance is managed and distributed, but it does not cover the foreign aid policy process. This murky process often leads to misperceptions and misunderstandings of China’s contribution to global health and international development.1

Reference 11 - 0.18% Coverage

A second domestic issue that affects China’s health aid to Africa is the lack of   
participation by Chinese civil society in these efforts. Successful implementation of health aid projects often hinges upon the support of civil society organisations.

Reference 12 - 0.31% Coverage

Yet unlike the United States, China does not have   
yet an obvious constituency outside the government that is dedicated to international development assistance. Chinese citizens and NGOs began to participate in humanitarian aid in the mid 1980s, but so far they have played only a very limited role in China’s health aid to other countries. As a high-ranking Chinese official admitted, the participation of Chinese NGOs was “far from sufficient”.1

Reference 13 - 0.44% Coverage

The same   
can be said about the engagement of government-organised NGOs, including the Red Cross Society of China, China Charity Foundation, Chinese-African People’s Friendship Association and the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation. In May 2011, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria froze payments of grants to China, because of “a collision between the fund’s conviction that grassroots organizations must be intrinsically involved in the fight to control diseases like AIDS, and the Chinese government’s growing suspicion of any civil-society groups that are not directly under its control”.

Reference 14 - 0.09% Coverage

hina’s rise is accompanied by the growing international pressure on it to shoulder more international responsibilities.

Reference 15 - 0.11% Coverage

argued that China refuses to reveal the total amount of development assistance because doing so could provoke strong domestic criticism of the government.112

Reference 16 - 0.24% Coverage

t is in China’s enlightened self-interests to promote in-depth and extensive exchanges, which would not only boost China’s image as a constructive partner in global governance, but also help China align with internationally accepted aid practice and avoid repeating the mistakes made by developed countries in providing foreign aid.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2016 Niu China’s development and its aid presence in Africa - § 1 reference coded [ 0.25% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.25% Coverage

Not surprisingly, China’s economic growth exerts increasing influence on the developing or underdeveloped countries, especially on African countries whose national economic targets are also aimed at eliminating poverty, pushing economic development forward and achieving prosperity. It is true that most of them gain confidence and momentum to develop their own economies by looking at China’s development experience within this unequal global market regime.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Denghua Zhang China in Pacific Regional Politics - § 6 references coded [ 4.57% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 1.78% Coverage

Similar to other regions, especially Africa where China’s growing role has been so visible over the last decade, the arrival of China in the Pacific has provided more opportunities for the island countries in terms of both financial assistance and development experience. As an example, following a serious riot in Nuku’alofa in November 2006, causing a loss of around one-tenth of the country’s gross domestic product, former Tongan Finance Minister Siosiua Utoikamanu complained that his government had sought assistance from traditional donors for rebuilding but had met with little response. Tonga then approached China, which responded quickly to provide generous concessional loans to support rebuilding (Zhang, 2015c, pp. 278–279). The US$3 billion soft loan facility was, however, poorly understood by the Tongan government, which had little knowledge of Chinese policy and processes and has made Tonga a very significant debtor nation to China (Powles, 2015, p. 272). China’s concessional loans also have a strong appeal to other countries in the region. An   
aid official from PNG noted that despite the criticism from the government and the public on rising debt risks in the country, the PNG prime minister insisted the national budget is on the right track and the government would continue to borrow from China (DNPM, 2014).

Reference 2 - 0.36% Coverage

This practice gives more discretion to the recipient governments on the use of Chinese assistance, and is welcomed by many PIC officials. China’s emphasis on building infrastructure projects is also welcomed where infrastructure improvement remains an important task.

Reference 3 - 0.64% Coverage

The Fiji case is an excellent example of how China has sought to fill a vacuum left by   
traditional powers. After the military coup in Fiji in December 2006, traditional powers such as Australia, New Zealand, the US and the UK imposed certain sanctions on Bainimarama’s military regime, including travel bans and military cooperation. Citing its principle of non-interference in partner countries’ domestic affairs, China took the opportunity to further develop relations with Fiji.

Reference 4 - 0.75% Coverage

During the 42nd PIF meeting in Auckland in September 2011, then New Zealand Prime Minister John Key warned PIC governments to consider seriously their ability to repay before accepting concessional loans from China (Trevett, 2011), while former Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard later noted that more accountability and transparency are needed from emerging donors in the Pacific region (AAP, 2013). Regional experts have also voiced concerns about the mixed quality of Chinese aid projects and the neglect of infrastructure maintenance (Dornan, 2016).

Reference 5 - 0.51% Coverage

At a time when China’s influence is growing rapidly in the Pacific region, trilateral aid cooperation becomes an example of how China and regional powers can find ways to work together rather than rivalling each other. In any event, it has been suggested that China has no interest in challenging existing patterns of regional cooperation or leadership (Wesley-Smith, 2013, p. 362).

Reference 6 - 0.52% Coverage

In addition, China’s preference for bilateralism means that its impact on regionalism, as such, will remain limited in the foreseeable future. Even so, by continuing to strengthen bilateral links with PICs while at the same time emphasising a common South–South identity, the foundations are being laid for a future in which China may well play a more significant role in Pacific regionalism.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Li Does Conditionality Still Work China’s Developmen - § 12 references coded [ 2.91% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.11% Coverage

The results show that the democratizing effects of the OECD’s development aid in Sub-Saharan Africa have indeed diminished.

Reference 2 - 0.18% Coverage

results from a synthetic control analysis suggest that major recipients of Chinese economic assistance did not achieve higher levels of political freedom than other comparable countries in the post-FOCAC period.

Reference 3 - 0.18% Coverage

he democratizing effect of aid conditionality works only during a period when recipient countries do not have other alternative sources of aid, allowing donors to more credibly commit to enforcing conditionality

Reference 4 - 0.26% Coverage

In the meantime, traditional donors may also feel compelled to compete with the new donors, reducing their credibility in enforcing the conditions. Consequently, the positive relationship between Western aid and democracy among the African recipients will dissipate as the amount of Chinese aid increases.

Reference 5 - 0.34% Coverage

China’s policy of non-interference and a ‘‘no-strings-attached’’ approach to aid is   
appealing to African leaders. In a 2009 survey of African ofﬁcials, ranking from junior military ofﬁcers to former presidents (from countries such as Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia, Cape Verde, and Zambia), 63 of the 67 interviewees expressed positive views about China’s aid in Africa (Horta 2013).

Reference 6 - 0.25% Coverage

econd, Chinese aid is usually disbursed very quickly and efﬁciently. A study by   
the Economic Strategy Institute credits the ‘‘sheer competence and speed with which China is able to negotiate and execute its development programs’’ as ‘‘an important element of its appeal’’ (Olson and Prestowitz 2011).

Reference 7 - 0.20% Coverage

inally, skeptical of and even disillusioned by the Western recipe for economic development inscribed in the Washington consensus, some countries now look to China’s model as a successful example to emulate (Chen and Kinzelbach 2015;

Reference 8 - 0.20% Coverage

To summarize, African countries have come to realize that they need options, not   
conditions, when it comes to aid. China’s aid and development ﬁnancing provides such options and is thus welcomed with open arms by many African countries.6

Reference 9 - 0.23% Coverage

Nevertheless, this may be bad news for traditional donors who have thus far been successful in tying aid to democratic reforms and other conditions. Indeed, Chinese aid projects have come out victorious in competitions with the World Bank on a number of occasions (Naim 2007).

Reference 10 - 0.48% Coverage

During the pre-FOCAC years (Models 2a–2c), the coefﬁcient estimates on ODA/   
GNP are still statistically signiﬁcant and positive at the 0.1 or 0.05 level in all three models, although the magnitude of the effects is considerably smaller (30–50%). By contrast, the coefﬁcients on ODA/GNP in the post-FOCAC years (Models 3a–3c) are all negative and statistically insigniﬁcant. This provides support for the ﬁrst hypothesis that the conditional effect of Western ODA on a recipient country’s democracy has diminished with the rise of China as an alternative source of aid.1

Reference 11 - 0.40% Coverage

discovered that the relationship between aid and democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa over the past three decades has been conditioned by two turns of events: the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and China’s expanded engagement with Africa in the twenty-ﬁrst century. The empirical evidence supports the thesis that aid conditionality works only during periods when African countries do not have alternative sources of aid, making the threat to pull the plug on aid more credible.

Reference 12 - 0.08% Coverage

Nevertheless, competition between China and the West is not, by deﬁnition, a bad thing for Africa.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Weng et al. Will China redefine development patterns in Africa - § 8 references coded [ 3.65% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.51% Coverage

he generous conditions within the ‘resources for infrastruc-   
ture’ investments placed Chinese investors at a distinct advantage compared to other foreign companies that had to source funds from ﬁnancial markets (Kinship, 2012). Thus, ﬁnancial support and concessional loans enabled Chinese national oil companies to expand their investments in Algeria, Angola, Chad, Mauritius, South Sudan and Niger, with Angola alone accounting for 50% of oil imports from Africa (Downs, 2007).

Reference 2 - 0.49% Coverage

The questionnaire results and site observations between 2012 and 2013 did not show signiﬁcant positive impacts on local communities. However, the majority of respondents did express the hope that the mining project would go ahead and they anticipated that it would eventually provide them with beneﬁts. The long period of negotiations and uncertainty raised local expectations and may have attracted people to the area, but until now they have been disappointed.

Reference 3 - 0.43% Coverage

That use of local employees was a priority as they cost less than imported labour’. Local people that we interviewed claimed: ‘we hope we get beneﬁts from the oil extraction which belongs to our land. We want more job opportunities and increased income to support our family and children for education, but we also worry about the environmental risks that may destroy our land’. Whether local communities would have

Reference 4 - 0.36% Coverage

China has now become a key partner in Cameroon’s economic development, particularly, in the construction of infrastructure. Strategic economic partnerships are a catalyst for mutual trust and cooperation (Sun, 2014). Political negotiations are necessary for economic cooperation but commercial viability is the driver of decision-making.

Reference 5 - 0.61% Coverage

Positive impacts from both projects at the exploration stages have been understandably limited. Mbalam iron ore project and Yanchang oil exploitation could provide local communities living in remote villages with the opportunity to improve their quality of life. We conclude that this would only have happened with effective implementation of management plans, as well as appropriate governance measures. Positive outcomes might have been achieved if the companies worked with local stakeholders to ﬁnd solutions to meet both local livelihood needs and environmental standards

Reference 6 - 0.60% Coverage

China’s new priority in investing in Africa is shifting away from traditional extractive industry investment towards investments in ﬁnance, infrastructure and manufacturing. The implications of this shift for the livelihoods of local people living within the sites of Chinese private investment are as yet unclear. However, China’s new strategy appears to be placing more emphasis on the improvement of local livelihoods and on meeting environmental standards. This transformation was heralded by policies announced by President Xi and Prime Minister Li’s recent visits

Reference 7 - 0.27% Coverage

hina is unlikely to embark upon the radically different development model that many pundits have forecast. Only the future will tell if Chinese investments will achieve better development outcomes than those achieved by traditional Western investors

Reference 8 - 0.38% Coverage

Many of the private companies that appear likely to transform development patterns in Africa are global multi-nationals. Their impacts will be determined less by the countries from which they derive their ﬁnance or where they market their products and more by the effectiveness of the governance to which they are subject in the African countries where they operate.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Zhang Denghua Why cooperate with others Demystifying China’s trilateral - § 15 references coded [ 5.96% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.28% Coverage

It argues that strategically, China is putting growing emphasis on its identity as a growing great power in the development sector, using trilateral cooperation to build its global image. Technically, China’s four-decade long external engagement has promoted changes in its ideas about aid cooperation, thus reinforcing its desire for cognitive learning to improve its aid performance.

Reference 2 - 0.19% Coverage

Chinese aid lacks transparency and Beijing does not release country-based ﬁgures for its annual aid data. There are also differences in aid calculation between China and traditional donors (Br€autigam, 2011, p. 756; Grimm, Rank, McDonald, & Schickerling, 2011, p. 7).

Reference 3 - 0.52% Coverage

However, internally, many Chinese citizens do not understand the necessity of helping other countries when much of its own population continue to live below the poverty line, and especially when some recipient countries have a higher GDP per capita than China (Wang, 2014). One case was the ‘Macedonia school bus event’ in November 2011 when the public expressed discontent with China’s donation of 23 school buses to Macedonia while an over-crowded school bus in Gansu province crashed, resulting in heavy casualties (Zhu, 2012, p. 4). Recent research suggests that residents of economically disadvantaged western regions and provinces with high poverty rates are less supportive of foreign aid (Cheng & Smyth, 2016, p. 68).

Reference 4 - 0.75% Coverage

A Chinese aid ofﬁcial from CAITEC concurred with this, noting ‘these new measures originated in China’s learning from traditional donors’ (Interview, August 2015). In terms of aid evaluation, an acknowledged weak link in China’s aid management, Yu Zirong, Deputy Director-General of MOFCOM’s Department of Foreign Aid, said, ‘We have long emphasized project implementation but neglected evaluation. We should say the western aid practice is a very important reference for us’ (MOFCOM, 2014b). This learning process has even reached into controversial areas where China is under   
criticism such as environmental standards in China’s overseas projects. In February 2013, China promulgated the Guideline of Environmental Protection for Overseas Investment and Cooperation, the ﬁrst specialized guideline on environmental protection for Chinese companies operating overseas. Though it’s not binding, companies breaching environmental protection laws in recipient countries will face penalties from their headquarters in China.

Reference 5 - 0.40% Coverage

China is also softening its position on aid coordination, another sign of its gradual integration into the international community as a result of learning and its image-building efforts. For instance, China refuses to sign some regional aid effectiveness agreements such as the Cairns Compact in the Paciﬁc. However, positive changes are taking place. China signed the Vientiane Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2006 and the Kavieng Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2008, local versions of the Paris Declaration in Laos and Papua New Guinea, respectively.

Reference 6 - 0.29% Coverage

As China is increasing its foreign aid rapidly in recent years, the desire to learn useful   
aid policies and practices from traditional donors and UN agencies has grown stronger. China is showing interest in learning from traditional donors in its belly areas including aid procedures, feasibility study, evaluation and monitoring (Interview with a former Chinese senior aid ofﬁcial, September 2015).

Reference 7 - 0.29% Coverage

For instance, the Chinese government has taken a more proactive approach to the process of developing the Agenda 2030 compared with the Millennium Development Goals (Stahl, 2016b, pp. 169–171). To the Chinese government, ‘multilateral platforms are the important stage’ (duobian shi zhongyao wutai) (Chen, 2009), and China needs to make full use of multilateral diplomacy to serve its national interests.

Reference 8 - 0.12% Coverage

In 2012, UNDP conducted two research projects for CAITEC on civil society and think-tanks’ roles in foreign aid (UNDP, 2013, p. 6). UNDP also provided assistance when

Reference 9 - 0.18% Coverage

UNDP suggested MOFCOM clearly demonstrates the beneﬁts of China’s aid for recipient countries in the second white paper (UNDP, 2015, p. 5). It also developed the English version of China’s Measures for the Administration ofForeign Aid (2015, p. 5).

Reference 10 - 0.51% Coverage

The China–US trilateral aid project in Timor-Leste, one of their earliest trilateral coopera-   
tion in Asia, deserves attention as an example of their cooperation. It is also the only project that is highlighted in the outcome list of President Xi’s US trip in September 2015 (MFA, 2015b). The core of this small pilot project is technical assistance. Speciﬁcally, agricultural experts from China and the US taught Timorese farmers the knowledge and technical skills to increase the production of maize (China), beans and onions (US). Regular short-term classroom and in-ﬁeld demonstration sessions were held at the agricultural demonstration plots in Timor-Leste from November 2013 to December 2014 (Zhang, 2015).

Reference 11 - 0.26% Coverage

Aid ofﬁcials from the three countries involved conﬁrm that this trilateral project is the   
result of high-level political commitment from China and the US. Chinese ambassador to Timor-Leste Tian Guangfeng noted, ‘This project carries a heavy political signiﬁcance. It should show the image of China’s foreign aid projects to the outside world’ (Ping, 2014).

Reference 12 - 0.88% Coverage

Though China’s trilateral aid cooperation is growing steadily, obstacles to future cooperation remain, particularly bureaucratic decentralization in China and developed donors such as the US, differences in development assistance goals, divergent methods of aid delivery, capacity gaps and other political considerations (Lu Boynton & Savoy, 2012, p. 9). A former UNDP ofﬁcial commented that the structural arrangement that UNDP needs to ﬁrst approach MOFCOM’s Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs (DITEA, managing aid to China) rather than the Department of Foreign Aid (DFA, managing Chinese aid overseas) on all aid issues might constrain their trilateral cooperation (Interview, June 2016). Also, the long-standing mistrust between China and the US is deep-rooted and likely to remain (Lawrence, 2013, p. 2), which could affect their future trilateral cooperation. More dialogue between China and traditional donors is needed to build mutual trust.7 Another obstacle is that, China’s trilateral aid cooperation is subject to the endorse-   
ment of recipient countries (Wang, 2013), and ofﬁcials from some of these countries have expressed reservations about China–traditional donors cooperation

Reference 13 - 0.49% Coverage

Although the EU Council in 2008 supported experimentation in trilateral aid cooperation with China in Africa, many African ofﬁcials complained that African countries were not consulted sufﬁciently (Stahl, 2012, p. 17). The Kenyan ambassador to China Julius Sunkuli expressed concerns that Africa may gain little from China’s aid cooperation with traditional donors (Wikileaks, 2010). South African Minister Plenipotentiary Dave Malcolmson said that African countries were annoyed because they were not consulted on the issue (2010). As a result, China was reluctant to support the EU’s proposal for fearing of compromising its status as a developing country (Stahl, 2012, p. 17).

Reference 14 - 0.45% Coverage

China is paying increasing attention to global image building in the development area, thus using trilateral aid cooperation to promote its identity as a growing great power, which is also part of its efforts to ease anxiety as it rises. In the case of China–US trilateral cooperation, China has been keen to build an image as a responsible stakeholder in the eyes of the US. From the perspective of international engagement, China’s four-decade-long cognitive learning from western donors and UN agencies has generated changes in its ideas on aid cooperation, thus reinforcing its learning desire to improve aid performance.

Reference 15 - 0.35% Coverage

China’s trilateral aid cooperation sends a signal that China is interested in coopera-   
tion with traditional donors. As China continues to expand its foreign aid and plays a more proactive role in international development initiatives such as the Agenda 2030, opportunities exist for more trilateral aid cooperation between China and these partners. However, trilateral cooperation is still in the early stage of implementation and remains a small part of China’s overall aid programme. M

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Zhang and Smith China’s foreign aid system structure, agencies, a - § 13 references coded [ 4.31% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.40% Coverage

Unlike China’s other aid agencies, MOFCOM has an in-country presence to monitor its   
aid. MOFCOM sends staff to run Economic and Commercial Counsellors’ offices in almost all Chinese diplomatic missions overseas. Due to the shortage of staff – a common feature in Chinese central government agencies32 – it is not unusual for MOFCOM to select officials from the provinces and cities, particularly for remote posts. One duty of these offices is to manage foreign aid, though aid is not a high priority. T

Reference 2 - 0.36% Coverage

hese offices represent MOFCOM and the Chinese government in liaising with recipient governments and locally based Chinese companies. They get involved in the negotiations between China and recipient governments and, in theory, supervise the progress of aid projects. However, staffing limitations – and often lack of interest – hamper their ability to monitor and evaluate aid projects, let alone to develop coherent in-country aid programmes.

Reference 3 - 0.55% Coverage

As they lack aid expertise, staff from the Economic and Commercial Counsellors’ offices   
are mainly involved from the political perspective and are not expected to contribute technical knowledge. Technical experts employed by Chinese contractors look after these issues, while China Exim Bank monitors the finances for concessional loan projects that make up the bulk of China’s aid programme. While these offices can offer advice, they are constrained by MOFCOM’s policy instructions, the control of the contracting companies over technical details and – in the case of Chinese companies with a long history of operating in a country – local commercial and political ties.

Reference 4 - 0.09% Coverage

and investment promotion have greater weight than aid does in the annual assessments (kaohe) of MOFCOM staff.

Reference 5 - 0.22% Coverage

he close relationship between MOFCOM and Chinese aid contractors creates room for   
corruption. The CPC Central Disciplinary Committee scrutinised MOFCOM as part of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, and the first problem identified involved foreign aid.39

Reference 6 - 0.23% Coverage

MFA is an important participant in Chinese foreign aid decision-making, though its influence is often downplayed. We argue that MFA plays an indispensable role in Chinese aid policymaking. Central to understanding MFA’s role is the place of politics (zhengzhi) in China’s foreign policy

Reference 7 - 0.29% Coverage

Unlike in the US or French bureaucracies, movement of staff between government and academe is limited, so influence through the secondment of personnel is negligible. However, many ministries, particularly the three discussed above, have affiliated research institutes that conduct research and gather data on aid-related topics for their paymasters.

Reference 8 - 0.30% Coverage

China Foreign Affairs University and China Institute of International Studies are think   
tanks affiliated with MFA. However, as their research is focused on broad, global issues, research and recommendations on China’s foreign aid are limited. The situation at the MoF’s Research Institute for Fiscal Science is similar, where research on China’s foreign aid is sparse.

Reference 9 - 0.31% Coverage

ompared with MOFCOM, MFA and MoF, line ministries focus on technical issues rather than politics; however, there is scope for commercial benefit. Many projects are encouraged by their parent ministries to become profitable, or at least self-sustaining. In the case of agricultural teams, this may be through the sale of produce in local markets or exporting produce back to China.

Reference 10 - 0.36% Coverage

Despite their state links, China’s companies are largely apolitical, focussing more on com-   
mercial gain. The principal-agent dilemma is obvious in many cases.79 The Chinese government hopes to deliver good-quality aid projects that benefit China’s long-term political and economic interests, while building good relations with recipient countries. In contrast, China’s companies conduct aid projects mainly for economic benefit.

Reference 11 - 0.25% Coverage

As contractors become established in a country, their behaviour is likely to improve or at least adapt, particularly in countries with stronger governance settings.81 Even when oversight is weak, in order to secure future aid and commercial contracts Chinese companies may consider reputational issues.

Reference 12 - 0.28% Coverage

Players in China’s aid game try to maximise their impact on decision-making in a fluid and disaggregated system. The Party, not MOFCOM, is the final decision-maker on Chinese foreign policy and aid. Being designated by the Party as the custodian of aid, MOFCOM has an important role in managing Chinese aid, though its influence is often overstated

Reference 13 - 0.67% Coverage

As the keeper of the purse strings, MoF also plays an important role in Chinese aid deci-   
sion-making. In addition to MOFCOM and MFA, the proposals of Chinese aid projects need to be endorsed by MoF. A number of line ministries actively compete for a slice of China’s aid budget, but they are limited to their areas of technical expertise. The role of contractors in shaping China’s aid programme has been greatly understated, largely because they have no interest in advertising their role to outsiders. Chinese contractors have real skin in the aid game: securing aid projects means jobs for their workers, and profits and prestige for their directors. The tail of China’s aid system often wags the dog, leading to an aid programme dominated by infrastructure projects backed by China Exim Bank’s concessional loan programme.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2018 Xun and Shuai The International Political Significance of Chines - § 3 references coded [ 0.62% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.17% Coverage

We find that through the mechanisms of foreign policy preferences, vulnerability and credibility, Chinese foreign aid has decreased US manipulation of UNGA voting. However, this is not a subjective strategic choice on China’s part but the objective result of Chinese economic development

Reference 2 - 0.17% Coverage

Chinese foreign aid reduces the utility of the US use of foreign aid as a means of punishment (estimated value -0.713; standard deviation 0.216), but increases the utility the US obtains from using foreign aid as a reward for compliant voting (estimated value of 0.200; standard deviation 0.095).

Reference 3 - 0.28% Coverage

. In the game of foreign aid and UNGA voting, structural characteristics are more evident than strategic ones. This finding supports the theoretical hypothesis that structural conflicts between rising powers and existing hegemonic powers are hard to avoid in international relations, a situation that requires that China and the US confront these structural contradictions and handle the structural conflicts between rising and hegemonic powers appropriately

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Jianzhi Zhao The governance of China’s foreign aid system Evolution - § 6 references coded [ 2.08% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.47% Coverage

Comparatively speaking, however, CDB Qinghai is not so important among CDB branches. The reason of the mismatch is historical. When CDB began to make international development loans, the headquarter assigned each branch with target recipient countries by matching their level of economic development, similar to the twinning in domestic and foreign aid.15 Although Ethiopia quickly became an important oversea customer of CDB, the original institutional arrangement between Ethiopia and CDB Qinghai has maintained even though there are apparently

Reference 2 - 0.35% Coverage

A first factor lies in the incapacities of MOFCOM to coordinate China’s foreign aid to meet the demands of the Belt and Road Initiative that has become probably the most prominent foreign policy strategy of China. As China’s foreign aid increases fast and gets more complex, there is a need to have an agency specialized for aid issues that can hardly be a priority of MOFCOM in charge of multiple trade and economic issues.

Reference 3 - 0.13% Coverage

On one side, the creation of SIDCA seems an attempt to break path dependence by empowering MOF to play a bigger role in China’s foreign aid based on two aspects.

Reference 4 - 0.39% Coverage

trative system, it would be difficult for SIDCA to coordinate powerful ministries, particularly for MOFCOM. Second, SIDCA lacks professional and personnel resources. There is still no sign that SIDCA will integrate relevant aid agencies and functions from MOFCOM. Lacking professional and implementational capacities will in turn seriously limit SIDCA’s capacities to making policies and plans, oversee aid implementation, and evaluate aid performance.

Reference 5 - 0.57% Coverage

We argue the fact that economic agencies, represented by MOFCOM, have been consistently playing a central role in coordinating and implementing China’s foreign aid is due both to China’s adoption of Soviet Union’s economic model and the corresponding aid model in the 1950s, and to the further evolution of the system that created vested interests, increasing returns, perceived appropriateness, and heavy switching costs. The established path of evolution was even not altered when China transformed from a planned economy to a market one, fundamentally but incrementally. Such a path effect created an aid governance system that is different from most of the donors of the world.

Reference 6 - 0.17% Coverage

onetheless, the road for SIDCA to become the center of foreign aid is still long. The costs and risks in a major transition of functions from MOFCOM to SIDCA are obvious in the short run, and it is important

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Zhang et al. Tension and Adaptation in a Chinese Agricultu - § 17 references coded [ 7.04% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.70% Coverage

However, most of the experts had worked for State farms as farm planners, mechanical engineers, crop breeders, etc. in China. They did not speak English or Portuguese, the ofﬁcial language of Mozambique. Language barriers made it difﬁcult for these experts to accomplish the task of technology transfer. Except for the training expert who occasionally gave lessons to trainees in the classroom, most other experts stayed at the Centre managing the ﬁelds. The only channel they developed for communicating with locals concerning technology transfer was to hire local workers to help them in the ﬁeld. They taught these local workers in the ﬁeld with body language and simple local language that they acquired from the workers. All these workers were counted as trainees in task reporting.

Reference 2 - 0.28% Coverage

The Operator could ﬁre an expert if his performance was not satisfactory. However, there were no clear criteria for measuring performance. Relationships, rather than performance ratings, were what counted. In most cases, complaints/reports from peer experts were the main cause of dismissal of an expert.

Reference 3 - 0.69% Coverage

However, just as the Operator needed to balance the function between aid   
and business, the experts also struggled managing their identities as ‘experts’ or ‘businessmen’. As experts, some of their limitations—the language barrier in particular— restricted them from being ‘real experts’ in the local partners’ eyes. As businessmen, although they enjoyed the autonomy of making relatively trivial decisions concerning what they could grow in the ﬁeld, or what price they could set for the products sold, they could not make decisions on who should come to the Centre and how much could be reinvested in the Centre. The experts felt like ‘the snake in the tunnel’, sliding between rules imposed by the Operator and the expectations of both the Chinese government and the African

Reference 4 - 0.65% Coverage

However, it was not easy for the local partners to fulﬁl these obligations, as China did   
not provide budget aid directly to partner countries. In the ATDC case in Mozambique, just one employee from the MST worked part-time as a Local Coordinator, and she rarely came to the Centre although the Centre prepared an ofﬁce for her. Based on the author’s observations, there were some practical difﬁculties for the Local Coordinator. First, it was time consuming and expensive to work at the Centre as the distance between the Centre and the MST was substantial. There were no project funds budgeted for this purpose. Second, the coordination task was not easy. Extensive coordination with various government departments was required.

Reference 5 - 0.34% Coverage

Petty requests, like providing small quantities of vegetables to the Local Coordinator,   
could be met, but more signiﬁcant demands were ignored by the Chinese, as there was no amount ofﬁcially budgeted to provide emoluments to employees of the Government of Mozambique. This created tension between the two parties and occasionally caused delay of project implementation.

Reference 6 - 0.40% Coverage

The facilities in the Centre served as physical capital for the local partner. After the ownership of the Centre was transferred to local partner, it could be used freely by the partner country. It could be used as conference room and also could be rented out to international organisations to earn income. Other Government departments had to go through MST if they wanted to use the facilities in the Centre, which earned a political privilege for MST.

Reference 7 - 0.26% Coverage

The Centre functioned as a ‘platform’ for the host government of the partner country to demonstrate its achievements in international cooperation. The Centre was frequently visited by high-level government ofﬁcials, and they often made requests, during their visits, to Centre staff.

Reference 8 - 0.29% Coverage

The ATDC served as a window for the African government to understand China’s cooperation policy and make a better match when formulating future requests. Based on the cooperation experience of the ATDC, the partner country is better able to understand what China can provide for them in the ﬁeld of agricultural development.

Reference 9 - 0.45% Coverage

Maintenance and upgrade of facilities in the Centre relied on the Chinese experts and continuous technical support from China during the technical cooperation phase. Although ownership of the Centre has been transferred to the host government, expenses, such as maintenance and management fees including water, electricity and the cost of Chinese experts and local staff hired by these Chinese experts, continue to be paid by funds from China supplementing the earnings generated from daily operations.

Reference 10 - 0.28% Coverage

he project was embedded with strong Chinese characteristics as all hardware, technology and even culture from China, which made the identity of the Centre very blurry. It seems that both Chinese and Mozambican governments reached consensus that the identity issue could be ignored as long as the Centre moves   
forward.

Reference 11 - 0.30% Coverage

The blurred distinction between ownership and usage rights sometimes caused problems at the local level. But under the regime of mutual beneﬁt and interdependence, frictions between the two sides at the Centre could be resolved or harmonised through the intervention of high-level communication and/or concessions from each side.

Reference 12 - 0.36% Coverage

Cases like this were not rare, especially when it concerned maintenance of the hardware.   
When the door to the training ofﬁce building in the Centre was broken by one of the students of the FAO class, the Chinese experts tried to persuade the Local Coordinator to ask the student or the party who rented the room to ﬁx it. However, the complaint was in vain. The Chinese had to ﬁx the door. As the former director,

Reference 13 - 0.35% Coverage

For the Operator and the host partner, the success of the Centre earns not only some political credit as a political mission but also some economic proﬁts. For the Chinese experts and local project coordinator, the extra resources, monetary and non-monetary, were the biggest incentive for them to work harder and more creatively to keep the Centre in operation and achieve sustainability.

Reference 14 - 0.36% Coverage

The results suggest that the framework imposed by the Chinese State on the Centre set effective baselines for the project Operator and individual actors, while also creating ‘space’ for discretionary decision-making and creating incentives for the involved organisations and individuals to exert agency to balance the beneﬁts sought by participating states, the operating unit and individual actors.

Reference 15 - 0.27% Coverage

he speciﬁc ‘spaces’ and incentives created in the project design drove Centre staff to pursue the primary goals of all concerned parties. Economic, ideological and sociocultural factors play roles in this complex process of project implementation, reﬂecting the unique feature of China’s foreign aid.

Reference 16 - 0.49% Coverage

he results also showed that African partners were not passive recipients, contrary to the ﬁndings of some previous researchers, but active agents, pursuing their own objectives when engaging with the Chinese. This kind of agency is different from a dichotomous donor–recipient relationship, as the African agents—local workers aside—were not paid or employed by the project. It is this mutual effort, through role consolidation and adaption, that drove the implementation process of China’s aid project, rather than just China or local agency.

Reference 17 - 0.56% Coverage

ong-term commercial viability of the ATDC and its associated enterprises is the paramount objective. Elevation of longterm commercial viability as a project objective is consistent with the major tenets of Chinese international assistance efforts and with current Western theories of international development. These emphasise the importance of adapting to local contexts and learning during project implementation. In this sense, the effect of the ATDC project has actually gone beyond the aid paradigm of new institutionalism and neoliberalism. Exploring this ﬁnding merits further theoretical and empirical work.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2020 China’s Foreign Aid to Cameroon Perception fron NGOs 2007-2017 - § 13 references coded [ 6.70% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.55% Coverage

Chinese assistance in the form of projects is seen by the common citizens as quite visible. Their job is appreciated most when it comes to roads and building construction. For example the BAMENDA-MAMFE road (Chinese engineers in charge of the project worked tooth and nail to make the once muddy and winding road a thing of the past), the building incorporating the Ministries of Small and Medium Size Enterprises, Social Economy and Handicraft delivered in 2014, Ministry of Urban Development and Handicraft, without forgetting the Sports Palace of Yaoundé done recently.

Reference 2 - 0.70% Coverage

What they export ranges from, electronics to stuff like shoes and clothes. All that are exported from China to Cameroon are goods that are affordable to almost every stratum of society. Even the poorest can enter into possession of Chinese articles. The price of their articles is less expensive compared to those proposed by Western countries. This has led to the creation of job opportunities for ordinary job searching Cameroonians. Chinese imported motorcycles are substantially complementing the production of taxi services in all towns in Cameroon. Through the manufacture by Chinese of motorcycles named NANFANG and due to their affordable prices, it has become a fruitful business to Cameroonians who do motor taxis

Reference 3 - 0.96% Coverage

Thousands of taxi motorcycles could be accounted for in various towns in Cameroon. This has led to an increase in the supply of taxi services. You need not have a high level of education to make money. It has helped in the creation of many jobs, many out of poverty, and increased government revenue. It, therefore, helps to the economic development of Cameroon as well as increase social welfare. The most striking negative opinion mentioned by Ms Kompa is the   
negligence of local labor. Chinese firms import most of their labour, even the unskilled. On the balance, local labour could have been better off, if Chinese investors were hiring most of their services. China’s aid is tied to the purchase of Chinese goods and services. Almost all Chinese aid projects are executed by Chinese firms, with imported Chinese labor. Cameroonians perform only very low-skilled tasks like cleaning, driving, general labor. This is one of the areas in which Chinese assistance is heavily deplored in Cameroon.

Reference 4 - 0.23% Coverage

According to her, it is observed that the rapid rise in Chinese aid and its focus on projects, is a way of promoting Chinese firms and setting them on the international stage, thus providing a convenient platform to penetrate new markets.

Reference 5 - 1.01% Coverage

Local contractors and labour appear to be losers as Chinese aid is tied to the procurement of Chinese goods and services i.e. aid projects executed by Chinese firms with Chinese labour and equipment. Local contractors cannot bid for Chinese funded projects. The level of skill transfer from Chinese firms is certainly low when compared with Western investors who employ more highly educated Cameroonians. This gives the impression that as usual Cameroon is been exploited and this time it’s by China. During the interview, Ms Kompa raised the problem of job creation.   
Promoting job growth has and continues to be a central challenge for most of the South-South African countries, for example, Cameroon. China has forged its way into the donor community by providing tremendous Project Aid to Cameroon. With such grandiose projects, one will overwhelmingly expect a job booster within the country. However, that is not the case. China’s assistance has not created enough employment opportunities for Cameroonian that is worthy of consideration

Reference 6 - 0.36% Coverage

Chinese assistance in the health sector has increased the quantity and quality of healthcare services in the country. These sanitary structures have led to a reduction of the unemployment rate because it creates job opportunities ranging from doctors and nurses to ordinary surface technicians more known as cleaners, thus contributing to the welfare of various families.

Reference 7 - 0.49% Coverage

he presence of China in Cameroon shows to what extent China is concerned about the development of developing countries like Cameroon. Indeed, China helps Cameroon in its development process. According to him, China-Cameroon cooperation has led to the importation of goods deemed affordable for the local population. More than 60% of the Cameroonian population live in extreme poverty. So, the importation of cheap goods from China has permitted them to have an opportunity of creating small businesses

Reference 8 - 0.54% Coverage

For him, in the course of the implementation of their foreign aid, the Chinese do not interest themselves in the financing of socio-cultural projects. They invest little in those domains. The infrastructural domain is the mains recipient of Chinese foreign aid. They have done little in health and agriculture as compared to infrastructure. On the health domain, vital sectors have not yet been explored and are not in project until today. For example non-contagious chronic illnesses notably metabolic cardio illnesses such as diabetics, hypertension.

Reference 9 - 0.19% Coverage

From small household items to a variety of electronic and clothing items, the reaction of consumers has gradually transformed from astonishment to mere frustration and even resigned acceptance.

Reference 10 - 0.95% Coverage

There are several positive aspects of Chinese foreign aid to Cameroon besides infrastructure investments, such as humanitarian aid and the enhancement of security in conflict zones such as the Northern region with Boko Haram and the Northwest, Southwest separatist movements. China’s aid is seen by Cameroonian authorities as a means of support   
on aspects such as socio-cultural, political and economic. China’s strategy for aid effectiveness carries no conditionality nor strings attached, provides a possible way of developing self-driven agency for African countries particularly Cameroon. China centres its aid and economic development on infrastructure, capacity development, joint venture and this is quite visible as expressed through the surveys and interviews collected. The transaction cost of aid provided to Cameroon bears less complicated procedures. China in its foreign aid to Cameroon emphasizes on non-interference in the country’s internal affairs. T

Reference 11 - 0.32% Coverage

Another example is the structural adjustment programs undergone by Cameroon. This is one between other reasons that have made Cameroon to embrace China’s aid. Since Cameroon is embracing or turns to embrace Chinese aid while reducing its attachment to the West, Western donors do not see this well as they lose influence in Cameroon.

Reference 12 - 0.28% Coverage

Cameroon is already finding it difficult to repay its debts to China and this can be observed through Cameroon’s head of States recurrent visits to china since 2017 for a more flexible debt financing structure. This, to some extent, raises the fear that Cameroon’s sovereignty may be at stake.

Reference 13 - 0.12% Coverage

The organizations investigated by this study generally hold a positive impression of China’s foreign aid that attributed

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2020 Dong and Chapman Foreign aid study Chinese schools and Chinese point - § 1 reference coded [ 0.84% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.84% Coverage

Other Chinese scholars have argued that China’s foreign aid is not a challenge to the existing development assistance system. Firstly, China has not attempted to challenge the mainstream economic development theory (Ye, 2013, p. 54). Secondly, China’s foreign aid belongs to SSC among developing countries, which is essentially different from DAC development assistance. Chinese scholars mainly put forward corresponding policy recommendations under the SSC framework. As an emerging donor, China is a leader in SSC (Yao, 2019, p. 37) and should strengthen communication and coordination with emerging aid powers, maintain its foothold and develop SSC assistance (Mao, 2010, p. 58). In terms of the multilateral global aid system, China also has no intention to challenge the historical norms and policies advocated and implemented by multilateral development agencies (Ye, 2013, p. 54). Thirdly, in terms of aid scale, DAC donors are still the main force of development assistance, and the scale of aid from developing countries, including China, remains limited (Huang & Tang, 2013b,p. 23) and is not enough to challenge the dominant position of the largest traditional donors (Pang, 2013, p. 34). Although China’s aid to sub-Saharan Africa is of considerable scale, these areas were originally neglected by traditional donors (Pang, 2013, p. 36). Therefore, China’s foreign aid is a complement to the existing international development assistance system

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2020 Xuefei Shi From Chengdu to KampalaThe Role of Subnational Actors - § 14 references coded [ 3.57% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.19% Coverage

In addition to political motivations, twinning assistance brings tangible economic returns for the   
givers. Accompanied by various aid funds, project construction, investment opportunities, and the dispatch of party cadres are contractors from giver provinces.

Reference 2 - 0.30% Coverage

The most signiﬁcant impact decentralized cooperation brings could be the eﬀectiveness of   
ongoing twinning mechanism and the increasingly active participation of provincial and local actors in the delivery of China’s foreign aid and the follow-up cooperation, which yields tangible economic beneﬁts for the subnational actors and assures the sustainability of aid programs that will not be discontinued when aid ﬂow ends

Reference 3 - 0.11% Coverage

By undertaking the construction and operation of an aid project, an expert team can attract   
follow-up investments and oﬃcial visits from its home province

Reference 4 - 0.45% Coverage

The credibility they have inside their old community and family as an important social capital shortens usual bargain process and lowers transaction costs, which can accelerate the materialization of a business plan. As shown in the previous section, an FAO-China agricultural team has been successful in bridging hometown companies from Sichuan with the Entebbe government, which eventually led to a Sichuan agrotechnology park in Uganda. Even the medical team in Uganda had a close relationship with them and exhibited enthusiasm in the cause, which was enhanced by the shared dialect and regional identity between Sichuan and Yunnan.

Reference 5 - 0.51% Coverage

Decentralized cooperation further attracts more funds for development purposes from the   
provincial and local levels in China. Noting that the economic size of certain Chinese provincial units even surpasses that of several small OECD countries,53 the ﬁnancial and ﬁscal resources available in these provinces for development cooperation have been so far underestimated in the literature. As far as ﬁnancing policy is concerned, a province, even a city, has its own regulations and budgets to support decentralized cooperation. An eligible expert team may receive a standardized stipend, a training subsidy and a performance bonus, as well as the continuation of salary for team members in their home institutions

Reference 6 - 0.07% Coverage

e least, decentralized cooperation justiﬁes the economic autonomy of subnational   
Chinese actors.

Reference 7 - 0.18% Coverage

y strategically positioning decentralized cooperation in their foreign economic adventures, Chinese provinces and cities can avail themselves of the heads-up beneﬁts from forming twinning relations with one or several destination countries.

Reference 8 - 0.30% Coverage

For instance, while the better industrialized Jiangsu and Fujian provinces are able to form cooperation with Tanzania in the light industry, the less developed Sichuan province has alternatively chosen Uganda as the destination for its agro-technology. For provincial and local governments in China, promoting comparative advantages in overseas markets has become prioritized in decentralized cooperation.

Reference 9 - 0.62% Coverage

In the decentralized cooperation of health, agrotechnology and education, the actors are always subject to the administrative jurisdiction of provincial and local governments, meanwhile, in contracted aid, contractors are responsible to the central agencies that authorize contracts, which are usually related to construction projects and material assistance. For instance, the medical team stationed in the Naguru China–Uganda Friendship Hospital in North Kampala is assembled with doctors from hospitals in Yunnan province. The contracts of medical equipment in the Naguru hospital, however, were oﬀered to China Astall Trading Co.Ltd.and China National Pharmaceutical Foreign Trade Corporation. Both companies have acquired certiﬁcation from MOFCOM for contracting national aid projects, which is a separate system from decentralized cooperation.

Reference 10 - 0.10% Coverage

Bad communication in English or in local languages poses another signiﬁcant challenge for the eﬃciency of knowledge transfer in China’s

Reference 11 - 0.08% Coverage

The reason for the deﬁciency is believed to be a lack of qualiﬁed staﬀ and training capacity at the provincial level.

Reference 12 - 0.26% Coverage

ecentralized cooperation is further confronted with competition from domestic twinning for   
the limited supply of human resources. Participating in overseas aid projects was once a privilege for Chinese doctors, engineers, and agronomists because of the beneﬁts not available from domestic jobs, including better stipends, free garments, and access to rare goods

Reference 13 - 0.23% Coverage

The lack of qualiﬁed human resource for decentralized cooperation could be a problem for provincial and local governments in the long run as the Chinese central government is supporting the SSC by increasing training and education quotas for the developing countries,63 which may eventually be allocated to subnational levels.

Reference 14 - 0.17% Coverage

Provincial and local actors in decentralized cooperation might have their own agendas that are not   
always in line with thoseof the central government or simply could not accomplish the goals set by Beijing due to their limited capacity.